Bücher von Daniel M. (University of Wisconsin Hausman

This book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics. It clarifies and for the most part defends the way in which economists invoke preferences to explain, predict and assess behavior and outcomes, although it criticizes attempts to define welfare in terms of preferences and to define preferences in terms of choices or self-interest.

An anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science. Completely revamped, this edition contains new selections, a revised introduction and bibliography bringing this volume up to date. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.

Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy and Public Policy, first published in 2006, shows through accessible argument and numerous examples how understanding moral philosophy can improve economic analysis, how moral philosophy can benefit from economists' analytical tools, and how economic analysis and moral philosophy together can inform public policy.

Causation is asymmetrical in many different ways. Causes precede effects; explanations cite causes not effects. Agents use causes to manipulate their effects; they don't use effects to manipulate their causes. Effects of a common cause are correlated; causes of a common effect are not. This is a major book for philosophers of science that will also prove insightful to economists and statisticians.

This book offers a comprehensive introduction to the fundamentals of standard economics, to the strategies economists employ in applying their theories to solve particular problems, and to the ways in which economists assess their theories.