Bücher von Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock

The present book is a ¿meta-selection¿ of papers written between 1980 and 2020, most of them already published elsewhere, whereas two of them are published in the book for the first time. The book is divided in three uneven parts. The first part consists of twelve papers concerned with fundamental issues in the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of logic and formal semantics. The second part consists of eleven papers in basically the same areas, though also concerned with the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of science, and relating to one or more philosophers, e.g., Husserl, Frege, Kant, Kripke or Carnap. The third and by far much shorter part consists of two papers on a completely different area of philosophy, namely, political philosophy. The first one is concerned with the distortions of the words ¿democracy¿ and ¿socialism¿ at the hands of the U.S. governments, respectively, of Marxists; while the second tries to explain the correct sense precisely of the words ¿democracy¿ and ¿socialism¿.

The book contributes to the refutation of the separation of philosophy in the 20th century into analytic and continental. It is shown that Edmund Husserl was seriously concerned with issues of so-called analytic philosophy, that there are strict parallelisms between Husserl's treatment of philosophical subjects and those of authors in the analytic tradition, and that Husserl had a strong influence on Rudolf Carnap's 'Aufbau'.

The present collection of seventeen papers, most of them already published in international philosophical journals, deals both with issues in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language and epistemology. The first part contains critical assessments and somewhat deviant renderings of the work of two seminal philosophers, Frege and Husserl, as well as of the young Carnap and Kripke. The second part contains analyses of central issues in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of mathematics and semantics, including arguments on behalf of Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics, a defense of second-order logic, a new definition of analyticity, a sketch of a semantics for mathematical statements and a critique of Kripke's possible world semantics for modal logic.

Examining the scholarly interest in the origins of logical empiricism, and especially the roots of Rudolf Carnap's "Der logische Aufbau der Welt" (The Logical Structure of the World), the author challenges the received view, according to which that book should be inserted in the empiricist tradition.

Gottlob Frege is one of the greatest logicians ever and also a philosopher of great significance. This book offers a presentation of the main topics of Frege's philosophy, including, his philosophy of arithmetic, his sense-referent distinction, his distinction between function and object, and his criticisms of formalism and psychologism.