Bücher von Harry G. Frankfurt

A #1 NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLEROne of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit. Everyone knows this. Each of us contributes his share. But we tend to take the situation for granted. Most people are rather confident of their ability to recognize bullshit and to avoid being taken in by it. So the phenomenon has not aroused much deliberate concern. We have no clear understanding of what bullshit is, why there is so much of it, or what functions it serves. And we lack a conscientiously developed appreciation of what it means to us. In other words, as Harry Frankfurt writes, "e;we have no theory."e; Frankfurt, one of the world's most influential moral philosophers, attempts to build such a theory here. With his characteristic combination of philosophical acuity, psychological insight, and wry humor, Frankfurt proceeds by exploring how bullshit and the related concept of humbug are distinct from lying. He argues that bullshitters misrepresent themselves to their audience not as liars do, that is, by deliberately making false claims about what is true. In fact, bullshit need not be untrue at all. Rather, bullshitters seek to convey a certain impression of themselves without being concerned about whether anything at all is true. They quietly change the rules governing their end of the conversation so that claims about truth and falsity are irrelevant. Frankfurt concludes that although bullshit can take many innocent forms, excessive indulgence in it can eventually undermine the practitioner's capacity to tell the truth in a way that lying does not. Liars at least acknowledge that it matters what is true. By virtue of this, Frankfurt writes, bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.

Das philosophische Enfant terrible Harry G. Frankfurt ist zurück, und zwar mit einem Paukenschlag. Nach seinem Welterfolg Bullshit widmet er sich in bewährt streitbarer Manier einer hochaktuellen Debatte: ökonomische Ungleichheit. Während man sich allenthalben einig ist, dass die ungleiche Verteilung von Gütern und Reichtum das große Problem unserer Zeit sei, postuliert Frankfurt die radikale Gegenthese: Ungleichheit ist moralisch irrelevant. Mit schwindelerregenden Gedankenexperimenten wirft Frankfurt ein vollkommen neues Licht auf Begriffe wie Genügsamkeit, Glück und Gerechtigkeit - und beantwortet nebenbei die heikle Frage, warum wir nicht alle gleich viel haben müssen. In zwei Essays stellt Harry G. Frankfurt eine Debatte auf den Prüfstand, die bisher niemand hinterfragt hat, und bringt vermeintlich unumstößliche Gewissheiten ins Wanken. So rigoros wie wegweisend, so überraschend wie überfällig.

Für den Liebenden ist die Liebe eine Quelle von Gründen. Sie ist »auf berüchtigte Weise schwer zu erhellen«, darf aber, so Harry Frankfurt, nicht mit Vernarrtheit oder Lust, Besessenheit oder Abhängigkeit verwechselt werden, also mit dem, was eine Person glaubt oder fühlt. Liebe, so die Generalthese des Buches, ist vielmehr eine Sache des Willens, genauer: der praktischen Sorge um das, was für den, den man liebt, gut ist. Frankfurts scharfsinniges Buch schließt mit einer überraschenden Reflexion über die Selbstliebe, die er als die reinste Form der Liebe bezeichnet.

This 1988 volume is a collection of thirteen seminal essays on ethics, free will, and the philosophy of mind. The essays deal with such central topics as freedom of the will, moral responsibility, the concept of a person, the structure of the will, the nature of action, the constitution of the self, and the theory of personal ideals. By focusing on the distinctive nature of human freedom, Professor Frankfurt is able to explore fundamental problems of what it is to be a person and of what one should care about in life.

In this classic work, best-selling author Harry Frankfurt provides a compelling analysis of the question that not only lies at the heart of Descartes's Meditations, but also constitutes the central preoccupation of modern philosophy: on what basis can reason claim to provide any justification for the truth of our beliefs? Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen provides an ingenious account of Descartes's defense of reason against his own famously skeptical doubts that he might be a madman, dreaming, or, worse yet, deceived by an evil demon into believing falsely. Frankfurt's masterful and imaginative reading of Descartes's seminal work not only stands the test of time; one imagines Descartes himself nodding in agreement.