Bücher von Keith Dowding

By providing a balanced introduction to and overview of economic approaches to government, the book will be useful to undergraduate and postgraduate students in public administration and public policy, as well as academics and practitioners in these fields interested in the application of the economic way of thinking.

Governments conveniently blame social problems on their citizens, placing too much emphasis on personal responsibility. This book shows that 'nudging' citizens to better behaviour simply isn't good enough and explains why we should hold our politicians responsible for social problems.

This book contributes to and expands on the major international Comparative Policy Agendas Project.

This book presents thirteen essays from a leading contemporary political scientist, with a substantial introduction bringing together the themes. The topics covered include political and social power, freedom, choice, rights, responsibility, the author's unique account of luck and systematic luck and the nature of leadership. There are also discussions of conceptual analysis, the structure-agency debate, luck egalitarianism, Sen's liberal paradox, problems in the measurement of freedom and choice and the differences between instrumental and intrinsic accounts of the value of freedom and related concepts. The wide-ranging material will provide an excellent text for students at all levels. It is appropriate reading for a host of courses in the fields of political science, political sociology and political theory at both undergraduate and graduate level. Whilst addressing some philosophically difficult and advanced subjects, the accessible writing makes the subject-matter comprehensible for all levels of students.

Over fifty years ago, Albert Hirschman argued that dissatisfied consumers could either voice complaint or exit when they were dissatisfied with goods or services. Loyal consumers would voice rather than exit. Hirschman argued that making exit easier from publicly provided services, such as health or education, would reduce voice, taking the richest and most articulate away and this would lead to the deterioration of public services. This book provides the first thorough empirical study of these ideas. Using a modified version of Hirschman's account, examining private and collective voice, and viewing loyalty as a form of social investment, it is grounded on a dedicated five-year panel study of British citizens. Given government policies over the past decade or more which make exit easier from public providers, this is a timely publication for all those who care about the quality of government services.

Accounting for Ministers uses the tools of modern political science to analyse the factors which determine the fortunes of Cabinet ministers. Utilising agency theory, it describes Cabinet government as a system of incentives for prime ministerial and parliamentary rule. The authors use a unique dataset of ministers from 1945 to 2007 to examine the structural and individual characteristics that lead to the selection and durability of ministers. Sensitive to historical context, it describes the unique features of different Prime Ministers and the sorts of issues and scandals that lead to the forced exit of ministers. The authors identify the structural factors that determine ministerial performance and tenure, seeing resignation calls as performance indicators. Probing the nature of individual and collective responsibility within Westminster forms of government, its rigorous analysis provides powerful new insights into the nature of Cabinet government.