Bücher von Nicholas Rescher

On Certainty continues Rescher's longstanding practice of publishing occasional studies that form part of a wider program of investigation of the scope and limits of rational inquiry in the pursuit of understanding. And pragmatism forms a subtextual Leitmotiv of these essays, seeing that the linking idea at work throughout is that knowledge is a tool for the management of our theoretical and practical affairs, and that what we ask of it is serviceability for the uses we have in view.

The present book is a natural outgrowth of Rescher's longstanding preoccupation with the rational systematization of our knowledge as manifested in such earlier works as Cognitive Systematization (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), and Complexity (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998). Accordingly, the role of principles in human affairs is crucial and ubiquitous. Principology, the theory of principles-underdeveloped through it may be-is accordingly bound to find a significant place in the sphere of philosophical inquiry regarding matters of thought and action.

Philosophizing is an activity-a process carries on by mind-endeavored creatures. But philosophy itself-the product of philosophy-is an abstraction which, as such, exists in its own way. Like chemistry or poetry, the things it deals with may be ever so real, but it itself exists in the realm of textuality. However the nature of philosophy's textual domain is seldom studied as such. The present discussion will take one very small step towards filling this gap.

Human finitude and its implications have long been one of the central themes of Western philosophy. The essays gathered together in this volume explore various facets of this not altogether pleasing fact with which we must realistically come to terms.

The present book brings together several case studies, dealing with relevant facets of the work of some of philosophy's all-time greats. The subject-matter topic being addressed differs significantly, but in each case there is an attempt to apply mathematical methods and perspectives to the solution of a key philosophical issue in a way that throws instructive light upon it. On this basis it emerges that the question "e;Are mathematical methods useful in philosophy?"e; finds a suggestive response in the fact that over two millennia key figures in the history of the subject have indeed thought so. And they have substantiated this view not so much by abstract argumentation on the basis of general principles, but by making this point through actual practice.

The present book continues Rescher's longstanding practice of publishing occasional studies written for formal presentation and informal discussion with colleagues. They form part of a wider program of investigation of the scope and limits of rational inquiry in the pursuit of knowledge.

During 2007-2008 Nicholas Rescher continued his longstanding practice of writing occasional studies on philosophical topics, both for formal presentation and for informal discussion with colleagues. While his forays of this kind have usually been issued in journal publications, this has not been so in the present case so that the studies offered here encompass substantially new material. Notwithstanding their thematic variation, these exemplify a problem-oriented method in the treatment of philosophical issues that is characteristic of Rescher's philosophical modus operandi and inherent in its endeavors to treat classical issues from novel points of view. For Rescher usually more concerned with what should be said about a philosophical question than with what X, Y, and Z have said about it, and he inclined to address issues of the latter sort primarily as a means for addressing the former.

The core of pragmatism lies in the concept of functional efficacy-of utility in short. And epistemic pragmatism accordingly focuses on the utility of our devices and practices in relation to the aims and purposes of the cognitive enterprise-answering questions, resolving puzzlement, guiding action. The present book revolves around this theme. All papers in this book bear on epistemological topics which have preoccupied Nicholas Rescher for many years. Much as with the thematic structure of this book, this interest expanded from an initial concern with the exact sciences, to encompass the epistemology of the human sciences, and ultimately the epistemology of philosophy itself.

While philosophers from Plato to Kant and beyond have discussed the mission and methodology of philosophy, this area of deliberation has only recently been acknowledged as a distinctive branch of philosophy as such, duly entitled metaphilosophy. There are, as yet, very few books on the subject so that the present volume joins a rather select group. Professor Rescher has published in the field for some thirty years and this book gathers together a representative sampling of his contributions. Taken together these pieces convey an instructive overview of the field, as well as vividly conveying their author's take on the key issues that constitute its problem domain.

This book is an integrated series of philosophical investigations that offers significant new insights into key philosophical concerns ranging from methodological issues to substantive doctrines. The second section is devoted to issues of knowledge and how the cognitive project goes about producing results that are cogent and objective.

The book sees to show that the present discussion so unfolds as to show that ultimately Reality's inherent impetus to lawful order serves also to account for its existence. The ultimate explanation of its order is as something that also provides for its reason for being. Step by step, a train of thought unfolds to indicate that Reality both exists and has the nature it does for good reason, and specifically because this is somehow for the best. Such an approach goes back to the Platonism of classical antiquity. Many difficulties lie in the way of its acceptance. But is it, in the final analysis, the theory that works here takes the form of a Neo-Platonism of sorts. Or if reality has any rational explanation at all, it is one that will have to proceed along these lines, based upon rationality itself.An underlying theme that runs throughout the present elaboration of metaphysics is the dialectic of interaction between descriptive facts on the one hand and normative ideals on the other. On such a view, it is a salient factor in metaphysics that reality as such is descriptively constituted as a potentially perfect system of knowledge even though we imperfect beings cannot get a more than an imperfectly secure cognitive grip on it. Accordingly, we can never hope to surmount the contrast between:*;The metaphysical ideal of a perfected system of knowledge.*;The imperfect realization of actuality that we can ever hope to achieve in practice.

Epistemology is more than the theory of knowledge

In theory and practice, the notion of fairness is far from simple

Philosophical Pragmatism looks at human affairs and the condition of man from a purposive point of view.

This book presents a nonstandard approach to epistemology. Where standard epistemology generally focuses on the certain knowledge the Greeks called episteme, the present focus is on some less assured modes of information. Its deliberations focus on such cognitively suboptimal processes as conjecture, guesswork, and plausible supposition.

Nicholas Rescher offers a grand vision of how to conceptualize, and in some cases answer, some of the most fundamental issues in metaphysics and value theory. He engages issues across a wide range of metaphysical themes, from different world views and ultimate questions to contingency and necessity, to empathy and other minds, moral obligation, and philosophical methodology.

This book is a survey of key issues in the theory of evaluation aimed at exhibiting and clarifying the rational nature of the thought-procedures involved. By means of theoretical analysis and explanatory case studies, this volume shows how evaluation is-or should be-a rational procedure directed at appropriate objectives.

This book showcases the history and theory of pragmatism and its alignment to the sensibilities of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Concept auditing is based on an innovative premise for philosophers: when they address an everyday life conception on the order of knowledge, truth, justice, fairness, beauty, or the like and purport to be dealing with what it involves, then they must honor the existing meanings of these terms. And insofar as the prevailing meaning is being contravened, they must explain how and justify why this is being done. They must, in sum, explain how their treatment of a topic relates to our established pre-systematic understanding of the issues involved and relate their deliberations to the prevailing conception of the matter they are proposing to discuss. The aim of a concept audit is to consider to what extent a given philosophical discussion honors this communicative obligation. Concept Audits sets out not only to explain and defend this procedure, but also to consider a host of applications and exemplifications of these ideas. Nicholas Rescher shows how this method of conceptual auditing can function to elucidate and evaluate philosophical theses and doctrine across a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from logic to ethics and metaphysics. Accordingly, he explains and illustrates an instructive innovation in philosophical method. This new study of philosophical methodology presents its method in a clear and convincing way and shows the method at work with respect to a wide spectrum of important philosophical issues.

Cognitive Complications examines fundamental issues in the theory of knowledge from the perspective of philosophical pragmatism. Rescher seeks to show how a pragmatic, user-oriented approach to knowledge can elucidate key issues of the field.

Presents a reassessment of free will and, as such, seeks to answer the question: Do humans ever act under the guidance of the will? To determine if humans have free will, this book first examines what exactly free will is and how it should function. It also examines the role of nature, nurture, and free choice.

The definitive mission of metaphilosophy is to facilitate an understanding of how philosophy worksthe aim of the enterprise, the instrumental and procedural resources for its work, and the prospect of its success. Nicholas Rescher unites two facets of metaphilosophy to show that historical perspective and forward-thinking normative, or systematic, metaphilosophy cannot be independent of one another. The descriptive, or historical, metaphilosophy provides an account of what has been thought regarding the conduct of philosophical inquiry, and the prescriptive, or normative, metaphilosophy which deliberates about what is to be thought regarding the conduct of philosophizing. Rescher argues that metaphilosophy forms a part of philosophy itself. This is a unique feature of the discipline since the philosophy of biology is not a part of biology and the philosophy of mathematics is not a part of mathematics. Ultimately, the salient features of philosophizing in generalincluding the inherently controversial and discordant nature of philosophical doctrinesare also bound to afflict metaphilosophy. Thus, only by a careful analysis of the central issues can a plausible view of the enterprise be developed.Metaphilosophy: Philosophy in Philosophical Perspective challenges the static, compartmentalized view of metaphilosophy, providing insight for scholars and students of all areas of philosophy.

This book examines how pragmatism's central idea can be applied and implemented across the entire range of philosophical deliberations, ranging from theory of knowledge and the value theory to the explanation of human action and even to matters of ethics and religion.

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Expounds a pragmatic metaphysics that offers an approach to this subject's traditional objective of providing us with a secure cognitive grip on the nature of reality. The characteristic nature of this metaphysical approach lies in its commitment to the idea that the requisite security is best.

Nicholas Rescher's book Axiogenesis: An Essay in Metaphysical Optimalism is a detailed exposition of axiogenerts: the philosophical theory seeking to explain the world's facts on the basis of evaluative considerations. In classical antiquity, this theory was espoused by Plato (in the Timaeus) and neo-Platonic tradition; in early modern times, it was revived by Leibniz and continued to find favor in the development of rational mechanics from Maupertuis to William Hamilton. However, since then the principles behind axiogenesis and similar theories have fallen out of fashion. This book is therefore unique in that it argues in detail that this metaphysical approach still has traction and endeavors to formulate the theory in a manner that makes it available as a live option for contemporary thinkers. Advanced students of philosophy and professionals in this field, as well as anyone interested in the issue of speculative metaphysics, will find Rescher's contemporary refashioning of axiogenesis a distinctly compelling read.

The studies collected here are united both by a common methodology of probative investigation and by their common purpose of providing instructive insight into a varied spectrum of important philosophical issues.