Bücher von Richard G Davis

This undertaking is a work of unusual form. At its core this work is a database covering Anglo- American strategic bomber operations against Germany, Italy, and Axis associated or occupied Europe. As such it allows swift and easy listing of day-by-day bombing, bombing of strategic target systems by location and tonnage, bombing of specific countries, comparisons of US and British targeting and operations, and much more. The work details strategic operations only- B-17 and B-24 bomber sorties by the four US numbered air forces in the European and Mediterranean theaters (Eighth, Ninth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth) and all bombing sorties for aircraft assigned to the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command and RAF 205 Group. This definition excludes US twin-engine medium bomb groups, which often hit the same aiming points as their four-engine compatriots, but includes twin-engine British Wellington medium bombers and twin-engine British Mosquito, Boston, and Ventura light bombers. Although the US heavy and medium bombers had instances of overlapping, targeting those instances usually fell into areas of what US doctrine defined as tactical rather than strategic bombing, such as frontline troops, transportation facilities feeding the front line, and airfields. US medium bombers did not fly deep into enemy country to attack industrial and strategic targets. The case differed for the RAF. Wellingtons and other medium bombers formed the backbone of the main bombing force from 1940 through late 1942 and throughout 1943 for 205 Group. Bomber Command's shortranged Bostons and Venturas of No. 2 Group raided French ports, power plants, and industrial targets until transferring to Tactical Bomber Force in May 1943. Likewise, Mosquitoes conducted numerous hit-and-run daylight raids until May of 1943 and then switched to night harassing attacks on German population centers, particularly Berlin, until the war's end. Such bombing furthered Bomber Command's campaign against the morale of the German labor force.

The strategic air campaign against Iraq engaged organizers from diverse disciplines with diverse views. That the storm, when it broke, lasted just forty-three days is a tribute not only to those who planned it, but also to those who executed it. The strategic air campaign, the focus of this volume, the second in the account of the United States Air Force's participation in the Persian Gulf War, began with a spectacular nighttime attack by Coalition aircraft against the capital city of Baghdad. This attack, seen by the world, occurred in concert with bomb and missile attacks against outlying command, control, and communications nodes and the electrical grid supporting them. The strategic air campaign also targeted Iraq's chemical and biological weapons production and the sites of nuclear reactors. The strategic bombing campaign against Iraq's aircraft shelters, particularly successful, is recounted in this volume, as is the Coalition's effort to prevent the launching by Iraq of Scud missiles toward her Arab and Israeli neighbors. The author has done a thorough job of utilizing the documentation produced by the Air Stall; the Ninth Air Force, and the former Strategic and Tactical Air Commands to describe the evolution of the combined command structure in Saudi Arabia. He has also conducted numerous valuable interviews with key USAF personnel and obtained much detailed information about the interactions among the participants whose responsibility it was to organize the campaign to free Kuwait. He exhaustively analyzes events and issues that preceded the execution of the strategic air war -operationally, Instant Thunder- and the rationale behind the selection of core strategic target sets -enemy centers of gravity. The author, Dr. Richard G. Davis, joined the USAF history program in 1980, transferring to the Air Staff History Branch in 1985 and to the Histories Division in 1990. He has published several articles on World War II strategic bombing and a military biography on one of the USAF's leading practitioners of strategic bombing, General Carl A. Spaatz. Davis became familiar with modern service programs and doctrine by covering the Program Objective Memorandum and issues surrounding the interservice agreements known as the "31 Initiatives" from 1985 to 1990.