Bücher von Vassilios Sitaras

The Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider is the first strategic bomber to attain hardware status since the Cold War B-2A Spirit, which was publicly unveiled in 1988 and introduced in 1993. First flown on November 10, 2023, the mighty Raider is destined to become the mainstay of Americäs long-range air fleet with at least 100 units entering service from around 2027 onwards. Once operational, it will certainly be the most advanced military aircraft in the World, as well as the first ¿Sixth Generation¿ warplane. Its main goal, apart from nuclear deterrence, is to render useless the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) battle networks created during the last decades by the revisionist Eurasian powers Russia and China. While details concerning this devastating weapon remain classified, we attempt a first assessment of its historical perspective, technical characteristics, concept of operations and challenges.

O De Havilland Mosquito e o Avro Lancaster foram dois dos aviões britânicos mais lendários de todos os tempos, apenas eclipsados pela fama do imortal Supermarine Spitfire. Voaram pela primeira vez com seis semanas de diferença, em 25.11.1940 o Mosquito e em 9.11.1941 o Lancaster, ambos equipados com o mesmo motor RR Merlin. Iniciando as operações de bombardeamento sobre a Europa na primavera de 1942, foram também produzidos em números semelhantes (7.781 Mosquitos e 7.377 Lancasters). Ainda assim, serviam duas filosofias de conceção diferentes: a filosofia dominante de um bombardeiro lento, fortemente armado e com uma carga devastadora (o poderoso Lancaster), versus a alternativa de um avião de combate muito rápido e desarmado, feito de madeira, com muitas aplicações (o Mosquito, compacto e polivalente). Surge inevitavelmente uma questão crucial: qual dos dois era mais económico/eficaz?

Le De Havilland Mosquito et l'Avro Lancaster sont deux des avions britanniques les plus légendaires de tous les temps, éclipsés seulement par l'immortel Supermarine Spitfire. Ils ont volé pour la première fois à six semaines d'intervalle, le 25 novembre 1940 pour le Mosquito et le 9 novembre 1941 pour le Lancaster, tous deux propulsés par le même moteur RR Merlin. Les opérations de bombardement au-dessus de l'Europe ont débuté au printemps 1942 et les deux appareils ont été produits en nombre similaire (7 781 Mosquito et 7 377 Lancaster). Pourtant, ils répondaient à deux philosophies de conception différentes : la philosophie dominante d'un bombardier lent, lourdement armé et doté d'une charge utile dévastatrice (le puissant Lancaster), et la philosophie alternative d'un avion de combat en bois, très rapide et non armé, aux applications multiples (le Mosquito, compact et multirôle). Une question cruciale se pose inévitablement : lequel des deux était le plus rentable ?

Il De Havilland Mosquito e l'Avro Lancaster sono stati due degli aerei britannici più leggendari di tutti i tempi, eclissati in fama solo dall'immortale Supermarine Spitfire. Hanno volato per la prima volta a sei settimane di distanza l'uno dall'altro, il 25.11.1940 il Mosquito e il 9.11.1941 il Lancaster, entrambi spinti dallo stesso motore RR Merlin. I bombardieri iniziarono a operare in Europa nella primavera del 1942 e furono prodotti in numero simile (7.781 Mosquito e 7.377 Lancaster). Tuttavia, essi servivano due diverse filosofie di progettazione: quella tradizionale di un bombardiere lento, pesantemente armato e con un carico utile devastante (il potente Lancaster), contro quella alternativa di un velivolo da combattimento in legno, molto veloce e disarmato, con molte applicazioni (il compatto e multiruolo Mosquito). Sorge inevitabilmente una domanda cruciale: quale dei due era più economico/efficace?

El De Havilland Mosquito y el Avro Lancaster fueron dos de los aviones británicos más legendarios de todos los tiempos, sólo eclipsados en fama por el inmortal Supermarine Spitfire. Volaron por primera vez con seis semanas de diferencia, el 25.11.1940 el Mosquito y el 9.11.1941 el Lancaster, y ambos llevaban el mismo motor RR Merlin. Comenzaron a bombardear Europa en la primavera de 1942 y se produjeron en cantidades similares (7.781 Mosquito y 7.377 Lancaster). Aún así, sirvieron a dos filosofías de diseño diferentes: la filosofía dominante de un bombardero lento, fuertemente armado y con una carga útil devastadora (el poderoso Lancaster), frente a la alternativa de un avión de combate muy rápido y desarmado, hecho de madera y con muchas aplicaciones (el Mosquito, compacto y polivalente). Surge inevitablemente una pregunta crucial: ¿cuál de los dos era más rentable?

De Havilland Mosquito i Avro Lancaster - dwa samyh legendarnyh britanskih samoleta wseh wremen, zatmiwshih swoej slawoj tol'ko bessmertnyj Supermarine Spitfire. Oni wperwye podnqlis' w wozduh s raznicej w shest' nedel' - 25.11.1940 g. Mosquito i 9.11.1941 g. Lancaster, i oba byli osnascheny odnim i tem zhe dwigatelem RR Merlin. Nachaw bombardirowochnye operacii nad Ewropoj wesnoj 1942 goda, oni takzhe byli proizwedeny w odinakowyh kolichestwah (7781 "Moskito" i 7377 "Lankasterow"). Tem ne menee, oni sluzhili dwum raznym filosofiqm proektirowaniq: osnownoj filosofii medlennogo, tqzhelowooruzhennogo bombardirowschika s razrushitel'noj poleznoj nagruzkoj (moschnyj Lancaster) i al'ternatiwnoj filosofii ochen' bystrogo i newooruzhennogo boewogo samoleta iz derewa, imeüschego mnozhestwo primenenij (kompaktnyj i mnogofunkcional'nyj Mosquito). Neizbezhno woznikaet wazhnyj wopros: kakoj iz ätih dwuh samoletow byl bolee äkonomichnym i äffektiwnym?

Die De Havilland Mosquito und die Avro Lancaster waren zwei der legendärsten britischen Flugzeuge aller Zeiten, die nur von der unsterblichen Supermarine Spitfire in den Schatten gestellt wurden. Sie flogen im Abstand von sechs Wochen zum ersten Mal, am 25.11.1940 die Mosquito und am 9.11.1941 die Lancaster, und beide wurden von demselben RR Merlin-Motor angetrieben. Als sie im Frühjahr 1942 ihre Bombereinsätze über Europa begannen, wurden sie auch in ähnlicher Stückzahl produziert (7.781 Mosquitos und 7.377 Lancasters). Dennoch bedienten sie zwei unterschiedliche Konstruktionsphilosophien: die gängige Philosophie eines langsamen, schwer bewaffneten Bombers mit verheerender Nutzlast (die mächtige Lancaster) und die alternative Philosophie eines sehr schnellen und unbewaffneten Kampfflugzeugs aus Holz mit vielen Einsatzmöglichkeiten (die kompakte und vielseitig einsetzbare Mosquito). Es stellt sich unweigerlich die entscheidende Frage: Welches der beiden Flugzeuge war kostengünstiger/effizienter?

The De Havilland Mosquito and the Avro Lancaster were two of the most legendary British aircraft of all time, eclipsed only by the immortal Supermarine Spitfire in fame. They flew for the first time six weeks apart, on 25.11.1940 the Mosquito and on 9.1.1941 the Lancaster and they were both powered by the same RR Merlin engine. Commencing bomber operations over Europe in the spring of 1942, they were also produced in similar numbers (7,781 Mosquitoes and 7,377 Lancasters). Still, they served two different design philosophies: the mainstream philosophy of a slow, heavily armed bomber with a devastating payload (the mighty Lancaster), versus the alternative one of a very fast and unarmed combat aircraft made of wood, with many applications (the compact and multi-role Mosquito). A crucial question inevitably arises: which of the two was more cost/effective?

On March 1, 2018, President V. Putin caused something of a stir, by publicly showcasing the newest version of Russiäs Doomsday Machine. The effect on Western public opinion was tremendous, creating the impression that Russia was updating its deterrent at an alarming pace. Still, rather limited information about this weaponry has been officially released in the (almost) five years which have followed the speech. Putting together the pieces of the jigsaw involves, inevitably, a lot of speculation. We summarize the most essential information and estimates about a total of 11 weapons of strategic and sub-strategic nature, either put in service recently (from 2010 till early 2023) or still under development. We also examine, briefly, the Russian nuclear doctrine and the strategy of active defense.

As a true bolt out of the sky, the AUKUS announcement shocked the entire World on 15/9/2021. The trilateral consultations leading to its conclusion were held ¿top secret¿ for several months between Australia (A), Britain (UK) and the United States (US). Most of the relative background is classified, and it will probably remain for many decades to come. The exact content of this security pact is also to be further clarified within the following years, because, for the time being, there has been only a general ¿framework agreement¿. This provides for Australia to receive nuclear propulsion technology, in order to construct a future class of attack submarines (SSNs), most likely eight in number. This small book is just a preliminary assessment of the facts publicly revealed in the first two months since the official announcement (15/9 ¿ 15/11/2021). Although they represent just the tip of the iceberg, they can provide some ground for analysis and comment. We shall also attempt some guessing of the shape of things to come, i.e. to identify the most likely hardware resulting out of the deal.

Twice since WW2, namely in the early 1960s and in the mid 1990s, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) initiated combat aircraft projects aimed at satisfying the different requirements and needs of more than one Armed Service. The first was the TFX or F-111, which flew in 1964 and served from 1968 till 1996 (In Australia till 2010). The second was the JSF or F-35, which first flew as a demonstrator (X-35) in 2000 and as a real fighter in 2006. It has been introduced in 2015 and will be operational till the 2070s. This paper follows the development History of both TFX and JSF programs, analyzing the numerous challenges they faced and evaluating their final outcome as effective weapons systems. We analyze the two aircraft from the perspective of cost as well as operational capability. The overall question examined is the following: do the gains, mainly in cost savings, of these two ¿joint¿ platforms justified the losses in performance?