Bücher der Reihe Brookings Occasional Papers

Bruce Blair examines operational safety hazards for nuclear forces deployed on combat alert in Russia, the United States, and elsewhere. He provides new information on command and control procedures and deficiencies that affect the risks of accidental, unauthorized, or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, particularly those in the former Soviet Union. Blair proposes changes in nuclear operations that would reduce these risks. Remedies range from eliminating targets from missiles to taking all nuclear forces off alert ("zero alert") so that no weapons are poised for immediate launch. In the "zero alert" scenario, missiles and bombers lack nuclear warheads or other vital components and require extensive preparations for redeployment. Blair assesses the effects of such measures on strategic deterrence and crisis stability in the event of a revival of nuclear confrontation between the United States and Russia. He also describes the burdens of verification that his remedies impose. This book is the first in a series devoted to aspects of operational safety and nuclear weapons. Other topics in the series include joint U.S.-Russian missile attack early warning, ensuring the security of dismantled warheads and bomb materials, and command-control problems in the emerging nuclear states.

"The Uruguay Round trade agreement, recently ratified by Congress, was the eighth in a series of negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Like the ratification proceddings, the negotiations were both contentious and extended. In the end, they substantially changed the structure of the GATT. From its traditional emphasis on reducing formal barriers to trade in goods, the GATT has now moved to a broader agenda of issues that will dominate in a more integrated world economy.The New GATT encompasses a set of agreements governing trade in goods, trade in services, the protection of intellectual property rights, and new procedures for resolving trade disputes. All of these measures are to be unified under a new institutional structure, the World Trade Organization. In this book, the major features of the new GATT are reviewed and assessed in terms of their implications for the United States.The contributors are Alan Deardorff, University of Michigan; Bernard Hoekman, the World Bank; John Jackson, University of Michigan School of Law; and Tim Josling, Food Research Institute, Stanford University.Susan M. Collins is a senior fellow in the Economic Studies program at Brookings and associate professor of economics at Georgetown University. Barry P. Bosworth, a senior fellow at Brookings, is the editor and author of numerous Brookings books, including The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges (Brookings, 1994) and Saving and Investment in a Global Economy (Brookings, 1993)."

"An estimated 25 million people worldwide are internally displaced-a significantly larger population than the 18 million refugees. Victims of civil wars, forced relocation, communal violence, natural and ecological disasters, and gross violations of human rights, they lack such human necessities as food, shelter, clothing, safety, basic health, and education. But because they remain inside their countries, they don't receive the same protection and assistance from the international community as those who cross borders and become refugees. Their plight, however, is drawing increasing international attention.In March 1992, Francis Deng was appointed Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to study this harrowing situation. In this book, a substantially revised version of his report to the UN, Deng examines the causes and consequences of internal displacement, the legal standards for protection and assistance, enforcement mechanisms, the prevailing conditions in the affected countries, and the urgent need for an international response.In a compelling first-person narrative, Protecting the Dispossessed follows Deng's investigation and is based on interviews and information from governments, international organizations, individuals, and visits to several countries in Europe, Africa, and Latin America.Deng argues that sovereignty entails a responsibility to ensure the safety and welfare of the citizens and to protect fundamental human rights; the international community must uphold this standard and make violators accountable. While he acknowledges that steps are being taken in the right direction, he maintains that there is still much to be done. He presents a bold proposal, one that requires substantial changes in the international system, in the politics of major governments, and in the relations between states. He proposes a three-phase strategy aimed at monitoring conditions worldwide: to detect impending crises, ale"

"This book examines the nature of the international arms trade and the adjustment of the defense industries in the United States and Russia to the post-cold war world. O'Prey highlights the substantial reduction in demand for armaments both on the world market and by the two countries. Although this decrease in demand results partly from the decline of the superpower rivalry, it also represents the culmination of technological and industrial trends that have been under way for over a decade.O'Prey argues that many observers have not recognized the long-term nature of these changes. As a consequence, industry representatives and some government officials in both countries often unwisely emphasize arms exports as a means to preserve their cold war defense industries. Given the high expectations of export success and low levels of demand, competition among arms suppliers has become intense. In the process, proliferation of armaments, technologies, and production processes to outlaw states has become more likely. In addition, false expectations of arms export success may lead officials to forgo necessary restructuring and conversion of their defense industries. This problem is especially pronounced in Russia.O'Prey offers a number of suggestions for resolving the problems posed by arms export competition and defense industry adjustment. He argues that in virtually all cases, cooperation or partnership between the U.S. and Russia will be essential. Potential measures range from mutual restraint in arms exports to private industry partnerships for defense conversion and ultimately to multilateral initiatives for defense industry and export cooperation."

"At the moment, the revision of security policy and the formation of a new consensus to support it are still at an early stage of development. The idea of comprehensive security cooperation among the major military establishments to form an inclusive international security arrangement has been only barely acknowledged and is only partially developed. The basic principle of cooperation has been proclaimed in general terms in the Paris Charter issued in November of 1990. Important implementing provisions have been embodied in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties. Except for the regulation of U.S. and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) strategic forces, however, these arrangements apply only to the European theater and even there have not been systematically developed. The formation of a new security order requires that cooperative theaters of military engagement be systematically developed. Clearly that exercise will stretch the minds of all those whose thinking about security has been premised on confrontational methods.Nonetheless, such a stretching is unavoidable. The new security problems are driven by powerful forces, reshaping the entire international context. They impose starkly different requirements. They will deflect even the impressive momentum of U.S. military traditions. The eventual outcome is uncertain. It turns upon political debates yet to be held, consensus judgements yet to form, and events and their implications yet to unfold. Fundamental reconceptualization of security policy is a necessary step in the right direction, and it is important to get on with it. Getting on with it means defining the new concept of cooperative security, identifying the trends that motivate it, outlining its implications for practical policy action, and acknowledging its constraints. These tasks are the purpose of this essay."

Among its many important effects, the political revolution in central Europe has provided a sharp reminder that international security is as much a state of mind as it is a physical condition. The threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, long hypothesized by Western defense ministries on the basis of a perceived imbalance in inherent conventional force capability, is now acknowledged to be a practical impossibility because shifts in political alignment have been credited. In the wake of that judgement, the force deployments themselves are virtually certain to be reduced, equalized, and disengaged, thereby removing firepower advantage as a threat to international stability. Moreover, though the intrinsic connection is remote, a similar judgement seems to be affecting global strategic deployments. As strategic forces are projected to be reduced to common ceilings by mutual agreement, the fear of preemptive attacks on theoretically vulnerable land-based installations appears to be receding more rapidly than the inherent capability that originally inspired it.This relief from the narrowly focused, obsessive fears that have dominated U.S. security policy for several decades is certainly a constructive development, but unfortunately it is not comprehensively valid. For strategic forces in particular, some subtle interaction between human judgement and physical capability remain potentially dangerous, presenting a security problem that will not be resolved simply by completing the projected agenda of national weapons development and international arms control agreements. The problem arises from conceivable combinations of events that are undoubtedly improbable but unprecedentedly catastrophic should any of them ever occur. The standards of safety that have evolved for improbable disasters of much smaller magnitude-nuclear reactor meltdown, for example-have been applied to only peacetime operations and have not been extended to the circumstances of advanced crisis or to the actual implications of combat operations. To appreciate the implications of this limitation and the dangers that emerge from it requires a substantial revision of standard perspectives on strategic security.