Bücher der Reihe Elements in Austrian Economics

This Element examines the development of the pension crisis through the lens of political economy. We analyze the knowledge and incentive problems inherent in the institutional structure, governance, and accounting of public pensions. We conclude by offering several institutional, governance, and reporting reforms to address the pension crisis.

Economists commit a category mistake when they treat democratic governments as indebted. Monarchs can be indebted, as can individuals. In contrast, democracies can't truly be indebted. They are financial intermediaries that form a bridge between what are often willing borrowers and forced lenders. The language of public debt is an ideological language that promotes politically expressed desires and is not a scientific language that clarifies the practice of public finance. Economists have gone astray by assuming that a government is just another person whose impulses toward prudent action will restrict recourse to public debt and induce rational political action.

Presents a new framework for Austrian capital theory, starting from the notion that capital is the value attributed by the valuer to the combination of production-goods and labor available for production. Incorporates the seminal contributions into the new framework in order to provide a more accessible perspective on Austrian capital theory.

Institutions are the 'rules of the game' that facilitate economic, social, and political interactions. They include legal rules, property rights, constitutions, political structures, and norms and customs. The Austrian economics framework provides an understanding for which institutions matter for growth, how they matter, and how they emerge and change.