Bücher der Reihe Elements in Metaphysics

Although the subject matter of this Element is properties, do not expect in-depth introductions to the various views on properties 'on the market'. Instead, here that subject matter is treated meta-philosophically. Rather than ask and try to answer a question like do properties exist? this Element asks what reasons one might have for thinking that properties exist (what problem properties, if they exist, are there to solve), what counts as solving that (or those) problems (including what counts as 'a property'), as well as how we ought to proceed when trying to find out if properties exist (by which method this ought to be decided). As it turns out, these questions and their answers are all intricately intertwined. Theory comparison and theory evaluation is in other words (and perhaps not that surprisingly) tricky. Do properties exist? After reading this Element all we can say is therefore this: that depends.

Historically, philosophical discussions of relations have featured chiefly as afterthoughts, loose ends to be addressed only after coming to terms with more important and pressing metaphysical issues. F. H. Bradley stands out as an exception. Understanding Bradley's views on relations and their significance today requires an appreciation of the alternatives, which in turn requires an understanding of how relations have traditionally been classified and how philosophers have struggled to capture their nature and their ontological standing. Positions on these topics range from the rejection of relations altogether, to their being awarded the status as grounds for everything else, to various intermediary positions along this spectrum. Love them, hate them, or merely tolerate them, no philosopher engaged in ontologically serious metaphysics can afford to ignore relations.

Philosophical thinking about time is characterised by tensions between competing conceptions. Common sense suggests there is an objective present, and that time is dynamic. Science recognises neither feature. This Element examines McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time.