Bücher der Reihe Elements in the Philosophy of Science

Scientific Knowledge and the Deep Past: History Matters is an accessible tour of the philosophy of the historical sciences. Examining how dinosaurs grew and the emergence of flowering plants in the mid-Cretaceous, it analyses the relationship between knowledge and the past, explaining why narratives play a prominent role in history.

Jonathan Y. Tsou examines and defends positions on central issues in philosophy of psychiatry. The positions defended assume a naturalistic and realist perspective and are framed against skeptical perspectives on biological psychiatry.

This Element provides an accessible introduction to the contemporary philosophy of causation. It introduces the reader to central concepts and distinctions and to key tools drawn upon in the contemporary debate. The aim is to fuel the reader's interest in causation, and to equip them with the resources to contribute to the debate themselves.

Objectivity is a key concept both in how we talk about science in everyday life and in the philosophy of science. This Element explores various ways in which recent philosophers of science have thought about the nature, value and achievability of objectivity.

Explores the Bayesian approach to the logic and epistemology of scientific reasoning. It introduces the probability calculus as an appealing generalization of classical logic for uncertain reasoning, explores Bayesian epistemology and applies the formal tools and principles to a handful of topics in the epistemology of scientific reasoning.

This Element introduces the reader to the concept of grounding and some of the key issues that animate contemporary debates around it, such as the question of whether grounding is 'unified' or 'plural' and whether there exists a fundamental level of reality.

The holistic thesis developed by Pierre Duhem challenges the idea that our evidence can conclusively falsify a theory. Given that no scientific theory is tested in isolation, a negative experiment can always be attributed to components other than the theory we test - to the auxiliary hypotheses and background assumptions. How do scientists decide whether the experimental result undermines the theory or points at an error in the underlying assumptions? Duhem argues that we cannot offer a rule that directs when the scientist should employ a radical or conservative strategy in light of a negative result, and ultimately they will appeal to their intuition. More recently philosophers have offered a number of strategies of how to locate error and justify the abandonment of a theory or an auxiliary hypothesis. This Element analyses Duhem's response to holism and subsequent accounts of how the problem can be resolved.