Bücher der Reihe Philosophical Studies Series

This book explores, in rich and rigorous ways, the possibilities and limitations of ¿thick¿ (concepts of) autonomy in light of contemporary debates in philosophy, ethics, and bioethics.Many standard ethical theories and practices, particularly in domains such as biomedical ethics, incorporate minimal, formal, procedural concepts of personal autonomy and autonomous decisions and actions. Over the last three decades, concerns about the problems and limitations of these ¿thin¿ concepts have led to the formulation of ¿thick¿ concepts that highlight the mental, corporeal, biographical and social conditions of what it means to be a human person and that enrich concepts of autonomy, with direct implications for the ethical requirement to respect autonomy. The chapters in this book offer a wide range of perspectives on both the elements of and the relations (both positive and negative) between ¿thin¿ and ¿thick¿ concepts of autonomy as well as their relative roles and importance in ethics and bioethics.This book offers valuable and illuminating examinations of autonomy and respect for autonomy, relevant for audiences in philosophy, ethics, and bioethics.

This book addresses controversies concerning the epistemological foundations of data science: Is it a genuine science? Readers will discover a defense of inductivism and consideration of the arguments against it: an epistemology of data science more or less by definition has to be inductivist, given that data science starts with the data.

This book offers a synthesis of investigations on the ethics, governance and policies affecting the design, development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI). Each chapter can be read independently, but the overall structure of the book provides a complementary and detailed understanding of some of the most pressing issues brought about by AI and digital innovation. Given its modular nature, it is a text suitable for readers who wish to gain a reliable orientation about the ethics of AI and for experts who wish to know more about specific areas of the current debate.

This book features a unique selection of works presented at the 2019 annual international conference of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy (IACAP). Every contribution has been peer-reviewed, revised, and extended. The included chapters are thematically diverse; topics include epistemology, dynamic epistemic logic, topology, philosophy of science and computation, game theory and abductive inferences, automated reasoning and mathematical proofs, computer simulations, scientific modelling, applied ethics, pedagogy, human-robot interactions, and big data, algorithms, and artificial intelligence.The volume is a testament to the value of interdisciplinary approaches to the computational and informational turn. We live in a time of tremendous development, which requires rigorous reflection on the philosophical nature of these technologies and how they are changing the world. How can we understand these technologies? How do these technologies change our understanding of the world? And how do these technologies affect our place as humans in the world? These questions, and more, are addressed in this volume which is of interest to philosophers, engineers, and computer scientists alike.

This volume provides an extensive overview of the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence for the Sustainable Development Goals. The authors are experts contributing with perspectives from different fields. The comprehensive collection of chapters illustrates the pressing governance problems related to using AI for the SDGs, and case studies describing how AI is advancing and can advance the achievement of the Goals. Students, scholars, and practitioners working on AI for SDGs, the ethical governance of AI, sustainability, and the fourth revolution can find this book a helpful reference.

This book offers intriguing philosophical inquiries into biotechnological art and the life sciences, addressing their convergences as well as their epistemic and functional divergences. Rooted on a thorough understanding of the history of philosophy, this work builds on critical and ontological thought to interpret the concept of life that underscores first-hand dealings with matter and experimentation. The book breaks new ground on the issue of animality and delivers fresh posthumanist perspectives on the topics addressed. The authors embark on a deep ontological probe of the concept of medium as communication-bridging and life-bearing. They also take on the concept of performativity as biotechnological art.The book includes concrete, well-documented case studies and shows how certain narratives and practices directly impact ideas surrounding science and technologies. It will interest philosophers in art and technology, aesthetics, ontology, and the life sciences. It will also engage art practitioners in art and science, curators and researchers.

This work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book. This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology.