Bücher der Reihe Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

This book focuses on the role of miscommunication in the financial crises of developing nations. By examining the determinants of Asia's financial crisis of 1997-8, it demonstrates why developing democracies are vulnerable to breakdowns in communication and outlines the disastrous consequences of such breakdowns.

This analysis builds on earlier theoretical work by Mancur Olson, William Riker and Douglass North. Professor Schofield emphasizes that under some conditions architects of political change can put a new perspective on societal quandaries, such that societies can choose an option that has a better 'probability of a fit choice'.

The author proposes an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. He explains why leaders find it difficult to profit from their ability to call elections when they are popular and the opposition is weak.

In this 1989 book Charles Stewart analyses the development of the budgetary process in the House of Representatives between 1865 and 1921. The period began with the creation of the House Appropriations Committee and ended with the passage of the Budgetary Accounting Act.

This book explores the politics of wildlife conservation policy in Africa, specifically Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe.

This book examines how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation.

This book adapts a formal model of elections and legislative politics to study party politics in Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. The model uses the idea of valence, that is the party leader's non-policy electoral popularity.

This 1993 study uses the experience of Egypt, India, Mexico and Turkey to lay bare the dynamics of public sector growth, crisis and reform.

This book applies the basic ideas and models of economics to develop a single transactions framework to explain the key institutional arrangements across the whole range of public sector organization, the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau, and the state-owned enterprise.

A rational choice model analyses the problems of voter choice, the emergence of partly loyalty and cabinet government in Victorian England.

It is widely believed that current disparities in economic, political, and social outcomes reflect distinct institutions. Institutions are invoked to explain why some countries are rich and others poor, some democratic and others dictatorial. But arguments of this sort gloss over the question of what institutions are. This book was first published in 2006.

This book explores the political process by which property rights are defined and enforced in two traditional states in colonial Ghana. The case studies within the book ask how colonial institutions transformed indigenous political and economic life; and how colonisation and decolonisation affected prospects for future economic development and stability in Africa.

Democracies extract more tax revenue per capita than autocracies. This book addresses the origins of taxation, examining how it can be made compatible with political liberty and economic growth. This study speaks to readers of political economy of development and comparative institutions, and historians of state formation in Europe.

As capitalism defeated socialism in Eastern Europe, the market displaced the state in the developing world. Beyond the Miracle of the Market, first published in 2005, focuses on Kenya, a country that continued to grow while others declined in Africa, and mounts a prescient critique of the neo-classical turn in development economics.

By examining the case of Zambia, this book accounts for why and when politics revolves around one axis of social cleavage instead of another. Drawing on a simple model of identity choice, it shows that the answer depends on whether the country is operating under single-party or multi-party rule.

The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, beginning with Baker v. Carr in 1962, had far more than jurisprudential consequences. They sparked a massive wave of extraordinary redistricting in the mid-1960s. State legislative and congressional districts were redrawn more comprehensively - by far - than at any previous time in our nation's history.

This book models the emergence of the state, and the forces that shape it. State creation is bound to protection needs. A specialized protector-ruler is efficient, but is also self-seeking. Individuals will install a ruler only after they create a mechanism to control him.

David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. With implications for the study of constitutional design, political delegation, legislative organization, administrative law, and the role of the executive in policy making, this book redefines the study of legislative-executive relations under separate powers.

This book attempts to solve an enduring puzzle in women's electoral politics. Namely why the increasing importance of women's votes in the 1920s did not imply increasing success for the lobbying efforts of women's organizations.

This book explains the institutionalization of policy in response to anticipated and actual citizen behavior and the conditions under which citizens give, refuse and withdraw their consent.

This book investigates strategic coordination in elections worldwide.

This book investigates the sources and the limits of judicial authority in constitutional courts, focusing on the central role of public support for judicial independence. The book provides an in-depth study of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews.

This book examines a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations.

This book explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states, using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. These institutions often succumb to 'rent-seizing' - the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others.

The 1980s and 1990s have seen several authoritarian governments voluntarily cede power to constitutionally elected democratic governments. John Londregan uses Chile as a case study of this phenomenon, exploring what sorts of guarantees are required for those who are ceding power and how those guarantees later work out in practice.

This 2000 book addresses the discrepancy between the developing economy of England between 1720-1844, and the stagnant legal framework of business organization during the same period. The book focuses on the ways by which the legal-economic nexus of the period gave rise to the modern institutions of organizing business.

In Making a Market, Jean Ensminger analyses the process by which the market was introduced into the economy of a group of Kenyan pastoralists. This 1993 case study points out the importance of understanding the roles of ideology and bargaining power - in addition to pure economic forces, such as changing relative prices - in shaping market institutions.

Individuals, Institutions, and Markets offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions work. Integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology, Mantzavinos offers a genuine political economy showing how social institutions affect economic outcomes.

Integrates economics and politics, theory and econometrics, to provide the first coherent and general formal model of US political economy. Addresses formal tests of rationality in voting behaviour and rational voter behaviour when the executive and legislature are chosen simultaneously. Blends game theory, macroeconomics, voting theory, and econometrics.

This book uses a rational-choice approach to study the impact of Japanese law on economic growth in Japan.