Bücher der Reihe Studies in Cognitive Systems

Superminds are capable of processing information not only at and below the level of Turing machines (standard computers), but above that level (the "Turing Limit"), as information processing devices that have not yet been (and perhaps can never be) built, but have been mathematically specified;

Employing a distinction between systems for which signs are signif icant for the users of a system and others for which signs are significant for use by a system, I have sought to define the boundaries of what AI, in principle, may be expected to achieve.

These difficulties fall into four principal areas: defeasible reasoning (including the frame problem as apart), ordinary language (and the representation prob lems that it generates), the revision of beliefs (and its rules of inference), and knowledge representation (and the logical problems that are encountered there).

Our purpose in compiling the present volume has been to contribute to the foundations of this enterprise by bringing together classic papers devoted to crucial problems involved in understanding natural language, which range from issues of formal syntax and logical form to those of possible-worlds and situation semantics.

Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and computer science.

Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and to computer science.

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information and data-processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and to computer science. While primary emphasis will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental and methodological studies will also appear from time to time. The present volume illustrates the approach represented by this series. It addresses fundamental questions lying at the heart of artificial intelligence, including those of the relative virtues of computational and of non-computational conceptions of language and of mind, whether AI should be envisioned as a philosophical or as a scientific discipline, the theoretical character of patterns of inference and modes of argumenta­ tion (especially, defeasible and inductive reasoning), and the relations that may obtain between AI and epistemology. Alternative positions are developed in detail and subjected to vigorous debate in the justifiable expectation that - here as elsewhere - critical inquiry provides the most promising path to discovering the truth about ourselves and the world around us. lH.F.

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine.

Specifically, Perlman evaluates and criticizes the theories of mental content proposed by Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, Block, Harman and others, as well as examining verificationist approaches to meaning of Quine, Davidson and Stich.

Researchers and specialists in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, artificial life, complexity theory, and information theory.

Freud's Philosophy of the Unconscious is the only comprehensive, systematic study of Sigmund Freud's philosophy of mind.

In the present volume, Bruce Thyer has brought together an impressive collection of original studies concerning philosophical aspects of behaviorism, which continues to exert considerable influence even in the era of the Cognitive Revolution.

Its scope is intended to span the full range of interest from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental powers of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and computer science.

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information and data processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine.

It is meant to constitute part of my contribution to a continuing debate at the intersection of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, epistemology, and the philosophy of cognitive science.

Many metaphors go beyond pionting to the existing similarities between two objects -- they create the similarities. A comprehensive theory of metaphor is proposed in this framework that explains how metaphors can create similarities, and why such metaphors are an invaluable asset to cognition.

Mental Symbols is an essay on mind and meaning, on the biological implementation of mental symbols, on the architecture of mind, and on the correct construal of logical properties and relations of symbols, including implication and inference.

Cognitive science is a field that began with the realization that researchers in varied disciplines-psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy, formal semantics, neuroscience, and others-had taken on a common set of problems in representation and meaning, in reasoning and language.

Soar: A Cognitive Architecture in Perspective represents a European perspective on Soar with the exception of the special contribution from Allen Newell arguing for Unified Theories of Cognition.

Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and to computer science.

rules of language have no significance in language production and understanding, being descriptions of linguistic styles; analysis of computer modelling of the mental activity shows that in describing human knowing the computer is irrelevant;

He maintains that operant psychology has discovered (and continues to discover) reasonably well-confirmed causal principles of intentional behavior, which go beyond what cognitive psychology can provide, while cognitive psychology, in tum, has the potential to supply analyses (and explanations) that account for them.

In Part III, Seppo Sajama and Simo Vihjanen consider whether humans ever have direct access to reality (in Section A), while Matti Kamppinen and Antti Revonsuo explore the conse quences of the claim that our knowledge of reality is conceptually mediated (in Section B).

Many metaphors go beyond pionting to the existing similarities between two objects -- they create the similarities. A comprehensive theory of metaphor is proposed in this framework that explains how metaphors can create similarities, and why such metaphors are an invaluable asset to cognition.

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine.

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information and data processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine.