Bücher der Reihe Studies in Cognitive Systems

Employing a distinction between systems for which signs are signif icant for the users of a system and others for which signs are significant for use by a system, I have sought to define the boundaries of what AI, in principle, may be expected to achieve.

Superminds are capable of processing information not only at and below the level of Turing machines (standard computers), but above that level (the "Turing Limit"), as information processing devices that have not yet been (and perhaps can never be) built, but have been mathematically specified;

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine.

He maintains that operant psychology has discovered (and continues to discover) reasonably well-confirmed causal principles of intentional behavior, which go beyond what cognitive psychology can provide, while cognitive psychology, in tum, has the potential to supply analyses (and explanations) that account for them.

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine.

Freud's Philosophy of the Unconscious is the only comprehensive, systematic study of Sigmund Freud's philosophy of mind.

Examines the problem of developing a paradigm appropriate to computer science, taking account of the proponents' and opponents' views about formal methods.

In the present volume, Bruce Thyer has brought together an impressive collection of original studies concerning philosophical aspects of behaviorism, which continues to exert considerable influence even in the era of the Cognitive Revolution.

It is meant to constitute part of my contribution to a continuing debate at the intersection of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, epistemology, and the philosophy of cognitive science.

An important collection of studies providing a fresh and original perspective on the nature of mind, including thoughtful and detailed arguments that explain why the prevailing paradigm - the computational conception of language and mentality - can no longer be sustained.

Creativity is one of the least understood aspects of intelligence and is often seen as 'intuitive' and not susceptible to rational enquiry. This volume provides an overview of this field. It addresses a range of issues such as: Can computers be creative? Can they help us to understand human creativity?

Specifically, Perlman evaluates and criticizes the theories of mental content proposed by Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, Block, Harman and others, as well as examining verificationist approaches to meaning of Quine, Davidson and Stich.

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine.

Many metaphors go beyond pionting to the existing similarities between two objects -- they create the similarities. A comprehensive theory of metaphor is proposed in this framework that explains how metaphors can create similarities, and why such metaphors are an invaluable asset to cognition.

In Part III, Seppo Sajama and Simo Vihjanen consider whether humans ever have direct access to reality (in Section A), while Matti Kamppinen and Antti Revonsuo explore the conse quences of the claim that our knowledge of reality is conceptually mediated (in Section B).

He maintains that operant psychology has discovered (and continues to discover) reasonably well-confirmed causal principles of intentional behavior, which go beyond what cognitive psychology can provide, while cognitive psychology, in tum, has the potential to supply analyses (and explanations) that account for them.

rules of language have no significance in language production and understanding, being descriptions of linguistic styles; analysis of computer modelling of the mental activity shows that in describing human knowing the computer is irrelevant;

Many metaphors go beyond pionting to the existing similarities between two objects -- they create the similarities. A comprehensive theory of metaphor is proposed in this framework that explains how metaphors can create similarities, and why such metaphors are an invaluable asset to cognition.

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information and data-processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and to computer science. While primary emphasis will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental and methodological studies will also appear from time to time. The present volume illustrates the approach represented by this series. It addresses fundamental questions lying at the heart of artificial intelligence, including those of the relative virtues of computational and of non-computational conceptions of language and of mind, whether AI should be envisioned as a philosophical or as a scientific discipline, the theoretical character of patterns of inference and modes of argumenta­ tion (especially, defeasible and inductive reasoning), and the relations that may obtain between AI and epistemology. Alternative positions are developed in detail and subjected to vigorous debate in the justifiable expectation that - here as elsewhere - critical inquiry provides the most promising path to discovering the truth about ourselves and the world around us. lH.F.

It is meant to constitute part of my contribution to a continuing debate at the intersection of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, epistemology, and the philosophy of cognitive science.