Bücher der Reihe Studies in Economic Theory

Contrary to the standard theory which views the origin of uncertainty as being exogenous to the economic system, the theory of rational beliefs holds that a crucial component of social risk and economic fluctuations is endogenously propagated by variations in the state of beliefs of market participants.

This is the first book combining research on the Global Environment, Catastrophic Risks and Economic Theory and Policy. This book brings together new approaches on multiple levels: environmental sustainability requires rethinking in terms of economic theory and policy as well as the considerations of catastrophic risk and extremal events.

This book is intended to provide economists with mathematical tools necessary to handle the concepts of evolution under uncertainty and adaption arising in economics, pursuing the Arrow-Debreu-Hahn legacy.

The purpose of the conference was to bring mathematicians special ized in Riesz Spaces and economists specialized in General Equilibrium together to exchange ideas and advance the interdisciplinary cooperation between math ematicians and economists.

A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.

Classical scoring and ranking methods are introduced, including the Slater orderings, as well as new statistical methods for describing a tournament, graph-theoretical methods based on the covering relation and game-theoretical methods.

Instead, we now know that when different tallying methods are applied to the same ballots, radically different outcomes can emerge, that most procedures can select the candidate, the voters view as being inferior, and that some commonly used methods have the disturbing anomaly that a winning candidate can lose after receiving added support.

In recent years, the usual optimisation techniques have been extended to incorporate more powerful topological and differential methods, and these methods have led to new results on the qualitative behaviour of general economic and political systems.

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game.

The economic concept of equilibrium infers rational participants, yet what happens when analysts and traders behave unpredictably? Darwin takes over. This book shows how traditional economic equilibria can exist despite natural selection in irrational markets.

The contributing authors are Daniel McFadden, Rosa Matzkin, Emma Moreno-Garcia, Roger Lagunoff, Yakar Kannai, Myrna Wooders, James Moore, Ted Bergstrom, Luca Anderlini, Lin Zhou, Mark Bagnoli, Alexander Kovalenkov, Carlos Herves-Beloso, Michaela Topuzu, Bernard Cornet, Andreu Mas-Colell and Nicholas Yannelis.

Other topics include determinacy in OLG with cash-in-advance constraints, income distribution and democracy in OLG, learning in OLG and in games, optimal pricing of derivative securities, the impact of heterogeneity at the individual level for aggregate consumption, and adaptive contracting in view of uncertainty.

Proceedings of the Third International Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Antalya, Turkey, June 1997

The subject matter also has a wide leeway, ranging from solution concepts for economies to those for games and also including representation of preferences and discussion of purely mathematical problems, all within the rubric of choice variables belonging to an infinite dimensional space, interpreted as a commodity space or as a strategy space.

A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.

An analysis of criminal behavior from the perspectives of rational choice theory leading to suggestions for a criminal policy. Previous edition sold 900 copies world wide since its release in June 2001.

The volume o?ers a theoretical - tension of mathematical economics, applying recent results of Hopf algebras, quasi-Hopf algebras, representation theory, theory of categories, and defor- tion theories, in looking for suitable mathematical methodology of economic property rights theories and foundations of general theory of economic agr- ments.

Dif ferent customers may value each of these characteristics differently, hence the customer's type will not in general be captured by a unidimensional characteristic and a problem of multidimensional screening arises.

The purpose of the conference was to bring mathematicians special ized in Riesz Spaces and economists specialized in General Equilibrium together to exchange ideas and advance the interdisciplinary cooperation between math ematicians and economists.

The subject matter also has a wide leeway, ranging from solution concepts for economies to those for games and also including representation of preferences and discussion of purely mathematical problems, all within the rubric of choice variables belonging to an infinite dimensional space, interpreted as a commodity space or as a strategy space.

Here, two highly experienced authors present an alternative approach to optimal stopping problems. The basic ideas and techniques of the approach can be explained much simpler than the standard methods in the literature on optimal stopping problems.

Contrary to the standard theory which views the origin of uncertainty as being exogenous to the economic system, the theory of rational beliefs holds that a crucial component of social risk and economic fluctuations is endogenously propagated by variations in the state of beliefs of market participants.

Assuming only the minimal mathematics background required of every second-year graduate, the two volumes provide a self-contained and careful development of mathematics through locally convex topological vector spaces, and fixed-point, separation, and selection theorems in such spaces.

Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 appeared in a Symposium on Chaotic Dynamical Systems in Economic Theory (Volume 4, Number 5, 1994). For a course on dynamic optimization addressed to students with a good background in economic theory and real analysis, one can assign Chapter 2 as a partial introduction to the basic tech niques.

This second volume introduces general topology, the theory of correspondences on and into topological spaces, Banach spaces, topological vector spaces, and maximum, fixed-point, and selection theorems for such spaces

Proceedings of the Third International Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Antalya, Turkey, June 1997

This book consists of five acts and two interludes, which are all written as dialogues between three main characters and other supporting characters. Each dialogue critically examines extant theories and common misunderstanding in game theory and economics in order to find possible future developments of those fields.

With contributions by B. Grodal

In the area of dynamic economics, David Cass's work has spawned a number of important lines of research, including the study of dynamic general equilibrium theory, the concept of sunspot equilibria, and general equilibrium theory when markets are incomplete.