Bücher der Reihe Synthese Library

Discussions of the foundations of mathematics and their history are frequently restricted to logical issues in a narrow sense, or else to traditional problems of analytic philosophy.

This book is intended as an exposition of a particular theory of time in the sense of an interrelated set of attempted solutions to philosophical problems about it.

This book is about scientific theories of a particular kind - theories of mathematical physics. An attempt is made to say, rather precisely, what a theory of mathematical physics is and how you tell one such theory from anothe- what the identity conditions for these theories are.

I first became interested in Husserl and Heidegger as long ago as 1980, when as an undergraduate at the Freie Universitat Berlin I studied the books by Professor Ernst Tugendhat.

This anthology consists of a collection of papers on the nature of dis positions and the role of disposition concepts in scientific theories. The papers by Mackie, Essler and Trapp, Fetzer (in Section 11), Levi, and Tuomela appear here for the first time, and are simultaneously published in Synthese 34, No.

My original idea was to model the refutation of mechanism on the almost universally accepted G6delian refutation of Hilbert's formalism, but I kept getting stuck on questions of mathematical philosophy which I found myself having to beg.

Proceedings of the 1978 Pisa, Italy, September 4-8, 1978 Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science

Proceedings of the 1978 Pisa, Italy, September 4-8, 1978 Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science

The aim of this monograph is to present some of the basic ideas and results in pure combinatory logic and their applications to some topics in proof theory, and also to present some work of my own.

All of the papers except those of Griinbaum, Fine, the second paper of Friedman, and the paper of Adams appeared in a special double issue of Synthese (24 (1972), Nos. I am pleased to have been able to add the four additional papers mentioned in making the special issue a volume in the Synthese Library.

Analytic interest in third person objectivity is often spurned by Continental philosophers as being unduly abstract. Continental philosophers employ introspection in the interest of a project of description and classification that aims to be true to the full subtlety and complexity of the human condition.

It is gratifying to see that philosophers' continued interest in Words and Objections has been so strong as to motivate a paperback edition. This is gratifying because it vindicates the editors' belief in the permanent im­ portance of Quine's philosophy and in the value of the papers com­ menting on it which were collected in our volume. Apart from a couple of small corrections, only one change has been made. The list of Professor Quine's writings has been brought up to date. The editors cannot claim any credit for this improvement, however. We have not tried to imitate the Library of Living Philosophers volumes and to include Professor Quine's autobiography in this volume, but we are fortunate to publish here his brand-new auto bibliography. 1975 THE EDITORS TABLE OF CONTENTS V PREFACE 1 EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION 1. 1. C. SMAR T / Quine's Philosophy of Science 3 GILBERT HARMAN / An Introduction to 'Translation and Meaning', Chapter Two of Word and Object 14 ERIK STENIUS / Beginning with Ordinary Things 27 NOAM CHOMSKY / Quine's Empirical Assumptions 53 1AAKKO HINTIKKA / Behavioral Criteria of Radical Translation 69 BARRY STROUD / Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation 82 P. F. STRA WSON / Singular Terms and Predication 97 118 H. P. GRICE / Vacuous Names P. T.

In the last 25 years, the concept of information has played a crucial role in communication theory, so much so that the terms information theory and communication theory are sometimes used almost interchangeably.

During the academic years 1972-1973 and 1973-1974, an intensive sem inar on the foundations of quantum mechanics met at Stanford on a regular basis. In particular, the articles by Bub, Demopoulos, and Lande, as well as the second article by Zanotti and myself, appear for the first time in the present volume.

What we find, on doing so, is a body of mathematics, offering only a limited prospect of practical usefulness, but which on the theoretical side presents a strong challenge to conventional ideas.

Metaphor is one of the most frequently evoked and also a poorly understood concept in philosophy and literary theory. Over the years, several interesting approaches to metaphor have been presented or outlined. The authors of some of the most important approaches re-present their views or illustrate them by means of applications.

The Royal Institute of Philosophy has been sponsoring conferences in alternate years since 1969. It is hoped that this series will contribute to advancing philosophical understanding at the frontiers of philosophy and areas of interest to non-philos ophers.

- What are physical theories about: physical systems or laboratory operations or both or neither? - How are the various physical theories inter-related: like Chinese boxes or in more complex ways? - How does a theory face experiment: single-handed or with the help of further theories?

cake, even though it is typically given the pride of place in expositions in Frege's semantics. As a part of this attempted reversal of emphasis, Jaakko Hintikka has also called attention to the role Frege played in convincing almost everyone that verbs for being had to be treated as multiply ambiguous between the "is" of identity, the "is" of predication, the "is" of existence, and the "is" of class-inclusion - a view that had been embraced by few major figures (if any) before Frege, with the exception of John Stuart Mill and Augustus De Morgan. Hintikka has gone on to challenge this ambiguity thesis. At the same time, Frege's role in the genesis of another major twentieth-century philosophical movement, the phenomenological one, has become an important issue. Even the translation of Frege's key term "Bedeutung" as "reference" has become controversial. The interpretation of Frege is thus thrown largely back in the melting pot. In editing this volume, we have not tried to publish the last word on Frege. Even though we may harbor such ambitions ourselves, they are not what has led to the present editorial enterprise. What we have tried to do is to bring together some of the best ongoing work on Frege. Even though the ultimate judgment on our success lies with out readers, we want to register our satisfaction with all the contributions.

Of the four chapters in this book, the first two discuss (albeit in consider ably modified form) matters previously discussed in my papers 'On the Logic of Conditionals' [1] and 'Probability and the Logic of Conditionals' [2], while the last two present essentially new material.

Many philosophers have considered logical reasoning as an inborn ability of mankind and as a distinctive feature in the human mind; others are at least able to follow a logical argument and even to detect logical fallacies.

Wittgenstein's aphoristic style holds great charm, but also a great danger: the reader is apt to glean too much from a single fragment and too little from the fragments as a whole. After consulting unpublished notebooks and manuscripts which Wittgenstein wrote between 1929 and 1951, I became a very different reader.

Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science brings together original essays by both feminist and mainstream philosophers of science that examine issues at the intersections of feminism, science, and the philosophy of science.

This treatise, in its first part, moves from a consideration of behavior and ulterance through a definition of assertion as a kind of utterance to a consideration of statements, conceived of as products of assertion, to be represented by pairs of testing procedures of verification and falsification. The treatise, in its second part, identifies a small number of basic forms of testing procedures, affiliated to the syncategoremata of classical philosophy, and uses these to represent all distinguishable, humanly producible, forms of statement. This same apparatus is used, in the third part of the treatise, to explain our conception of an object of reference and of various constructions from such objects. Particular attention is given to bodies and to other things met with in space and time, where it is finally argued that bodies, as we have explained them, are our most fundamental objects of reference.

In many respects, Brentano conducted pioneering analyses of problems that are currently in the focus of cognitive science and artificial intelligence: from the problem of reference to that of representation, from the problem of categorial classification to ontology and the cognitive analysis of natural language.Brentano, in fact, dealt with and wrote on questions concerning the auditory stream (temporal apprehension), visual perception (continua, point of view, three-dimensional construction of phenomenal objects), intentionality, imagery, and conceptual space, considering these pertaining to a metaphysical enquiry. Moreover, Brentano displayed clear awareness of the complexity of problems and of the interrelations among different areas of inquiry. From this point of view, his theory, however complex, offers elements for the treatment of problems currently under investigation.Brentano's work is an antidote against physicalism and logicism, which dominated the 20th century epistemology, and as such appears to be a good philosophy candidate for cognitive science."A set of knotty questions are implied in the very title of Brentano's work "Psychology from an empirical standpoint". To solve them, Albertazzi guides us systematically through Brentano's life and works, investigating into the inherent complexity of both his view of mental life and the related methodology. In so doing, she discloses a number of threads into the open texture of modern philosophy of mind."Lia Formigari, Ordinary professor of Philosophy of Language, La Sapienza, Rome, Italy

Patrick Suppes is a philosopher and scientist whose contributions range over probability and statistics, mathematical and experimental psychology, the foundations of physics, education theory, the philosophy of language, measurement theory, and the philosophy of science.