Bücher der Reihe The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series

After Stalin''s death in March 1953, the Cold War changed almost overnight. The Soviet Union embarked on a course of reconciliation and greater openness. However, despite an end to the Korean War and progress on many other outstanding East-West questions, the Western world remained mistrustful of Soviet motives and policies and Soviet leaders remained suspicious of Western intentions. Less than a decade after Stalin''s death the Berlin Wall was erected and the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world close to nuclear annihilation. Was this development unavoidable? Was an opportunity missed to overcome and terminate the Cold War? Was there a possibility for the creation of a more stable, less threatening, and less costly world in both human and material terms? It is only now, after the end of the Cold War and based on recently declassified western documents and revelations from once-closed archives in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China, that new light can be shed on the nature of international Cold War policies in the years after Stalin''s death. The essays in this book offer a historical understanding of this crucial period of the Cold War, assessing both the possibilities for change and the obstacles to détente. The book draws on the collective talents of an international group of scholars with a wide range of historical, geographical, and linguistic expertise. All of the essays are based on original research, many of them drawing from previously inaccessible archival documents from both the East and West. This book should be read by everyone interested in the final stage of the defining conflict that was the Cold War.Contributions by: Csaba Békés, Günter Bischof, Jeffrey Brooks, Ira Chernus, Jerald A. Combs, Lloyd Gardner, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Hope M. Harrison, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Mark Kramer, Klaus Larres, Vojtech Mastny, Kenneth Osgood, Kathryn C. Statler, and Qiang Zhai

In the early years of the Atlantic Alliance, no bilateral relationship was more important than that between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Even so, the West German-American alliance was taxing for both sides during much of the first two decades of the Cold War. Ultimately, despite frequent, significant challenges to the alliance from without and within, the two allies managed to achieve a positive and productive relationship - Eisenhower and Adenauer explains how they did so. In both capitals, the top foreign policy makers were deeply involved in the conduct of what they viewed as a vital bilateral alliance, with both President Dwight Eisenhower and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer taking the lead in his own government. For the Americans, a rearmed FRG tightly bound to the West was the bedrock of any European security policy that could contain the Soviet Union for the long-term. For the West German government, their relationship with the United States was the bedrock of rehabilitation and, indeed, survival as an independent country. In this book, their alliance is closely analyzed to form new knowledge on the West German-American relationship during the Cold War.

Based on interviews and a broad array of sources from Russian and Austrian archives, this collection provides a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet occupation of Austria from 1945 to 1955. The contributors examine a wide range of topics, including Soviet occupation policies, violence and everyday life, and the image of "the Russians."

This study examines the origins, evolution, and goals of Polish and Estonian diaspora communities in Sweden during the Cold War. The author analyzes their links with both their host and homeland societies and investigates their clandestine efforts to undermine the communist regimes of their homelands.

This book examines the dynamic evolution of Western detente policies which sought to transform Europe and overcome its Cold War division through more communication and engagement. Kieninger challenges the traditional Cold War narrative that detente prolonged the division of Europe and precipitated America's decline in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Rather, he argues that policymakers in the U.S. Department of State and in Western Europe envisaged the stability enabled by detente as a precondition for change, as Communist regimes saw a sense of security as a prerequisite for opening up their societies to Western influence over time. Kieninger identifies the Helsinki Accords, Lyndon Johnson's bridge building, and Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik as efforts aimed at constructive changes in Eastern Europe through a multiplication of contacts, communication, and cooperation on all societal levels. This study also illuminates the longevity of America's policy of peaceful change against the background of the nuclear stalemate and the military status quo.

At the beginning of June 1961, the tensions of the Cold War were supposed to abate as both sides sought a resolution. The two most important men in the world, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, met for a summit in Vienna. Yet the high hopes were disappointed. Within months the Cold War had become very hot: Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall and a year later he sent missiles to Cuba to threaten the United States directly. Despite the fact that the Vienna Summit yielded barely any tangible results, it did lead to some very important developments. In The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History international experts use new Russian and Western sources to analyze what really happened during this critical time and why the parties had a close shave with catastrophe.

Drawing on recently declassified Soviet archival sources, this book sheds new light on how the division of Europe came about in the aftermath of World War II. The book contravenes the notion that a neutral zone of states, including Germany, could have been set up between East and West. The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin was determined to preserve control over its own sphere of German territory. By tracing Stalins attitude toward neutrality in international politics, the book provides important insights into the origins of the Cold War.

This study provides a comprehensive examination of the East-West occupation of Austria from the end of World War II to the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955. Examining US, Soviet, British, French, and Austrian sources, the authors trace the complex negotiation process that led to the signing of the treaty.

At the beginning of June 1961, the tensions of the Cold War were supposed to abate as both sides sought a resolution. The two most important men in the world, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, met for a summit in Vienna. Yet the high hopes were disappointed. Within months the Cold War had become very hot: Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall and a year later he sent missiles to Cuba to threaten the United States directly. Despite the fact that the Vienna Summit yielded barely any tangible results, it did lead to some very important developments. In The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History international experts use new Russian and Western sources to analyze what really happened during this critical time and why the parties had a close shave with catastrophe.

On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the ''Prague Spring'' reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decide that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for ''socialism with a human face.'' Dubcek and most of the other Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming that ''the fate of any socialist country is the common affair of all socialist countries'' and that the Soviet Union had both a ''right'' and a ''sacred duty'' to ''defend socialism'' in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from direct military action and covert operations to counter the Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia. The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United States and consider whether Washington might have given a ''green light,'' if only inadvertently, to the Soviet Union prior to the invasion.

In the US, the Cold War is often remembered as a two-power struggle. The Eisenhower administration placed an extremely high priority on victory in the Third World. This book assesses the impact of the globalizing Cold War and the process of decolonization on the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy. It is intended for diplomatic historians.

The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze the 'Prague Spring' and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United States and consider whether Washington might have given a 'green light,' if only inadvertently, to the Soviet Union prior to the invasion.

In this book an international group of scholars examines China's acceptance and ultimate rejection of Soviet models and practices in economic, cultural, social, and other realms.

For half a century, the United States and the Soviet Union were in conflict. But how and where did the Cold War begin? This book attempts to answer this question.

This book offers novel perspectives and insights into key themes of French foreign policy in the de Gaulle years (1958-69). Globalizing research on the ideas and impact of le général, the volume's 13 well-matched essays by leading experts in the field tap into newly available records, ranging from Europe to the US, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The volume is the first to reassess Charles de Gaulle's foreign policies from a global angle.