Bücher der Reihe Theory and Decision Library C

Mathematical economics uses mathematical tools and reasoning to describe and explain economic reality.

This book aims to present, in a unified approach, a series of mathematical results con cerning triangular norm-based measures and a class of cooperative games with Juzzy coalitions.

This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications.

TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT Investment expenditures of companies govern economic growth. Kriebel, 1989 notes that (already) in 1989 roughly 50 percent of new corporate capital expenditures by major United States companies was in information and communication technology.

This book aims to develop an institutional approach to general economic equi librium. Traditionally finite economies have been assessed as the most natural represen tations of real life economies, in particular of market economies.

This book tries to sort out the different meanings of uncertainty and to discover their foundations. It shows that uncertainty can be represented using various tools and mental guidelines. Behavior under uncertainty emerges from this book as something to base more on inquiry and reflection rather than on mere intuition.

The purpose of this book is to report to the international readership on the sophisticated research by Russian game theorists during the two decades 1968 - 1988. The book includes a collection of contributions in game theory and the related field of equilibrium theory which never had been published in English before.

Harrie de Swart is a Dutch logician and mathematician with a great and open int- est in applications of logic. Members of the group were, among o- ers, Thom Bezembinder (psychologist), Hans Peters (mathematician), Pieter Ruys (economist), Stef Tijs (mathematician and game theorist) and, of course, Harrie de Swart (logician and mathematician).

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail.

Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research deals with various aspects of game theory and their applications to Economics and OR related problems. The first four sections are devoted to the theory of two-person games, linear complimentarity problems and game theory, cooperative and noncooperative games.