Bücher veröffentlicht von Books Express Publishing

Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, reflects on his tenure as Commander of United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The first Admiral to command Southern Command, Admiral Stavridis broke with tradition from day one, discarding the customary military staff model and creating an innovative organization designed not solely to subdue adversaries, but, perhaps more importantly, to build durable and lasting partnerships with friends. As he has said often, "We are excellent at launching Tomahawk missiles; in this part of the world, we need to get better at launching ideas." From his unique perspective as commander, Stavridis uses his engagingly personal style to describe his vision for the command's role in the Americas, making the most of limited resources to create goodwill and mutual respect, while taking care of the serious business of countering illegal drug trafficking, overcoming a dangerous insurgency in Colombia, and responding to humanitarian crises. He also devotes chapters to USSOUTHCOM's role in nurturing institutional respect for human rights among the military and security forces of the region, in advancing health security, and in supporting a new regional strategy to counter the increasing challenge of urban and transnational gang violence. Citing the hemisphere's common geography, culture, economy, and history, Stavridis makes a passionate case for a common approach and strategy for defending our "shared home of the Americas" through an international, interagency, and private-public approach, all connected through coherent and effective strategic communication.

From the introduction by Michael Moseley, USAF Chief of Staff: "This book, "Guidelines for Command", is the result of countless hours of research and contains the collective thoughts and lessons learned from many previous commanders. It has a wealth of information to assist you during your tenure as a commander. Use it in conjunction with your personal leadership skills, your base's subject-matter experts, and your fellow commanders to lead our Airmen to new heights". Taking Command. Chapter 2: Leading and Developing Airmen. Chapter 3: Commanding Expeditionary Forces. Chapter 4: Commander's Programs. Chapter 5: Maintaining Standards and Administering Discipline. Chapter 6: Airmen and Family Assistance. Chapter 7: Compliance and Inspections. Appendix 1: Commander's Transtion Checklist. Appendix 2: How to Keep Your Boss Happy.

Foreword; Introduction; Chapter One: Maslow is Non-Deployable:Modifying Maslow's Hierarchy for Contemporary Counterinsurgency; Chapter Two:The Use of Cultural Studies in Military Operations: A Model for Assessing Values-Based Differences; Chapter Three: Developing the Iraqi Army:The Long Fight in the Long War; Chapter Four: The Way Ahead: Reclaiming the Pashtun Tribes through JointTribal Engagement; Chapter Five: The Application of Cultural Military Education for 2025; Chapter Six: Operational Culture: Is the Australian Army Driving the Train or Left Standing at the Station ? Conclusions. Appendixes. Photos. Maps.

Includes a foreword by Major General David A. Rubenstein. From the editor: "71F, or "71 Foxtrot," is the AOC (area of concentration) code assigned by the U.S. Army to the specialty of Research Psychology. Qualifying as an Army research psychologist requires, first of all, a Ph.D. from a research (not clinical) intensive graduate psychology program. Due to their advanced education, research psychologists receive a direct commission as Army officers in the Medical Service Corps at the rank of captain. In terms of numbers, the 71F AOC is a small one, with only 25 to 30 officers serving in any given year. However, the 71F impact is much bigger than this small cadre suggests. Army research psychologists apply their extensive training and expertise in the science of psychology and social behavior toward understanding, preserving, and enhancing the health, well being, morale, and performance of Soldiers and military families. As is clear throughout the pages of this book, they do this in many ways and in many areas, but always with a scientific approach. This is the 71F advantage: applying the science of psychology to understand the human dimension, and developing programs, policies, and products to benefit the person in military operations. This book grew out of the April 2008 biennial conference of U.S. Army Research Psychologists, held in Bethesda, Maryland. This meeting was to be my last as Consultant to the Surgeon General for Research Psychology, and I thought it would be a good idea to publish proceedings, which had not been done before. As Consultant, I'd often wished for such a document to help explain to people what it is that Army Research Psychologists "do for a living." In addition to our core group of 71Fs, at the Bethesda 2008 meeting we had several brand-new members, and a number of distinguished retirees, the "grey-beards" of the 71F clan. Together with longtime 71F colleagues Ross Pastel and Mark Vaitkus, I also saw an unusual opportunity to capture some of the history of the Army Research Psychology specialty while providing a representative sample of current 71F research and activities. It seemed to us especially important to do this at a time when the operational demands on the Army and the total force were reaching unprecedented levels, with no sign of easing, and with the Army in turn relying more heavily on research psychology to inform its programs for protecting the health, well being, and performance of Soldiers and their families."

Contains the definitive history of the extensive but little known U.S. Army amphibious operations during the Korean War, 1950-1953. Provides insights to modern planners crafting future joint or combined operations in that part of the world. Originally published in 2008. Illustrated.

In this work, Patrick Kelley interprets the intelligence environment of political, military and information empires. His contribution sheds light on the cause of enduring intelligence collection defi cits that affl ict the center of such empires, and that can coincide with their ebb and fl ow. Alert intelligence practitioners, present and future, can note here just how useful a fresh interpretation of the intelligence enterprise can be to a coherent understanding of the global stream of worrisome issues. Th e long-term value of this work will be realized as readers entertain the implications of Churchill's comment that "The empires of the future are the empires of the mind."

United States Army in Vietnam. Center of Military History publication number 91-14-1. Covers how the engineers grew from a few advisory detachments to a force of more than 10 percent of the Army troops serving in South Vietnam. The 35th Engineer Group began arriving in large numbers in June 1965 to begin transforming Cam Ranh Bay into a major port, airfield, and depot complex. Within a few years, the Army engineers had expanded to a command, two brigades, six groups, twenty-eight construction and combat battalions, and many smaller units. Photos. Maps. Illustrations.

Dr. Williams identifies the roots of organized crime in post-Ba'athist Iraq in an authoritarian and corrupt state dominated by Saddam Hussein and subject to international sanctions. He also explains the rise of organized crime after the U.S. invasion in terms of two distinct waves: the first wave followed the collapse of the state and was accompanied by the breakdown of social control mechanisms and the development of anomie; the second wave was driven by anarchy, insecurity, political ambition, and the imperatives of resource generation for militias, insurgents, and other groups. This monograph looks in detail at major criminal activities, including the theft, diversion, and smuggling of oil, the kidnapping of both Iraqis and foreigners, extortion, car theft, and the theft and smuggling of antiquities. The author also considers the critical role played by corruption in facilitating and strengthening organized crime. He shows how al-Qaeda in Iraq, Jaish-al-Mahdi, and the Sunni tribes used criminal activities to fund their campaigns of political violence. Dr. Williams also identifies necessary responses to organized crime and corruption in Iraq, including efforts to reduce criminal opportunities, change incentive structures, and more directly target criminal organizations and activities.