Bücher veröffentlicht von Naval Institute Press

This book is concerned with both the national security concerns of Asian maritime nations and the security of the Asian maritime commons. These are defined as the Pacific and Indian Oceans and associated seas, bays, and gulfs, with their included sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The most useful geographical designation for maritime Asia is the "Indo-Pacific." Bernard Cole provides both a survey of the maritime strategies of the primary nations of the Indo-Pacific region and an evaluation of the domestic and international politics that drive those strategies. The United States, Canada, Russia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, China, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, India, Pakistan, Iran, the smaller Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf states are all surveyed and analyzed. The United States, Japan, China, and India not surprisingly draw the most attention, given their large modern navies and distant strategic reach. The author concludes that the United States remains the dominant maritime power in this huge region, stretching from Canada to the Persian Gulf, despite its lack of a traditionally strong merchant marine. U.S. maritime power remains paramount, due primarily to its dominant navy. The Chinese naval modernization program deservedly receives a good deal of public attention, but Cole argues that on a day-to-day basis the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, as its navy is named, is the most powerful maritime force in Far Eastern waters, while the modernizing Indian Navy potentially dominates the Indian Ocean. In fact, a focus of this work is the exemplary description of all the region's navies, with the author noting the naval arms race that is underway, particularly in the area of submarine acquisition. Cole is careful to couch this phenomenon in the regional concerns about Chinese naval expansion and the desire to ensure a continued, massive U.S. naval presence. The current naval developments in the region evince elements of a naval arms race, but lack the coherent maritime strategies to make naval developments dangerous to regional peace and security. Most telling will be whether United States power and focus remain on the region, while adjusting to continued Chinese maritime power in a way acceptable to both nations. No other current or recent work provides such a complete description of the Indo-Pacific region's navies and maritime strategies, while analyzing the current and future impact of those forces.

How does one engage in the study of strategy? Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower argues that strategy is not just concerned with amassing knowledge; it is also about recognizing our imperfect understanding of the environment and respecting the complex nature of adaptation to the unforeseen or unexpected. In essence, the strongest strategists are those who commit to an education that cultivates a more holistic and adaptive way of thinking. With that thought in mind, the contributors to Strategy, each a current or former professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, widely considered the Department of Defense's premier school of strategy, offer ways of thinking strategically about a variety of subject matters, from classical history to cyber power. Practitioners in the profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, must employ critical thinking where the application of power on land, at sea, in the air, and in space and cyberspace are concerned. Strategy examines various sub-disciplines regarding the use of power, and illuminates different approaches to thinking which have implications beyond the implementation of force.

Keep from All Thoughtful Men overturns much accepted historical dogma on how World War II strategy was planned and implemented. It is taken for granted that the Axis powers were defeated by an avalanche of munitions that poured forth from pitiless American factories. So it is amazing that the story of how this "miracle of production" was organized and integrated into Allied strategy and operations remains untold. Keep from All Thoughtful Men is the first book that tells how revolutions in both statistics and finance changed forever the nature of war. While the book relates the overall story of how economics dictated war planning at the highest levels, more specifically it tells how three obscure economists came to have more influence on the conduct of World War II than the Joint Chiefs. Because military historians rarely understand economics and economic historians just as rarely involve themselves with the details of war, there has never been a military history that shows how economics influenced the planning of strategy and the conduct of any war. This is sadly true of even World War II, which has been called by Paul Samuelson, "The Economist's War."

The U.S. Marine Corps' four-year campaign against al Qaeda in Anbar is a fight certain to take its place next to such legendary clashes as Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Chosin, and Khe Sanh. Its success, the author contends, constituted a major turning point in the Iraq War and helped alter the course of events and set the stage for the Surge in Baghdad a year later. This book brings to light all the decisive details of how the Marines, between 2004 and 2008, adapted and improvised as they applied the hard lessons of past mistakes. In March 2004, when part of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) was deployed to Anbar Province in the heart of the Sunni triangle, the Marines quickly found themselves locked in a bloody test of wills with al Qaeda, and a burgeoning violent insurgency. By the spring of 2006, according to all accounts, enemy violence was skyrocketing, while predictions for any U.S. success were plummeting. But at that same time new counterinsurgency initiatives were put in place when I MEF returned for its second tour in Anbar, and the Marines began to gain control. By September 2008 the fight was over. Richard Shultz, a well-known author and international security studies expert, has thoroughly researched this subject. His book effectively argues the case for the Marines changing the course of the war at Anbar, which is contrary to the conventional wisdom that the Surge was the turning point.

Operation KE explores the air combat that attended the Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal in early 1943a topic which has hitherto received very little attention. Operation KE was successful largely because Japanese strategic planning and tactical execution was basically sound. The traditional view holds that the Japanese got away with the initiative largely because the Americans let them; the U.S. Pacific high command felt it was not worth the effort to try and stop them. The authors contend that this was not entirely the case. They argue that the Cactus Air Force and Guadalcanal-based naval units did their best to disrupt the evacuation, still believing that the Tokyo Express was bringing reinforcements and supplies to the 17th Army. Other US forces in the South Pacific did make a half-hearted and questionably-executed attempt to stop the Japanese, but were bluffed into adopting a "e;wait-and-see"e; posture.Operation KE focuses on the air war fought between the Cactus and US 13th Air Forces on the one hand and the Japanese Navy and Army Air Forces on the other, from mid-December, 1942 to mid-February, 1943. The book scrutinizes the US air strikes against the six KE-related Tokyo Express destroyer runs, plus related air strikes against the Japanese merchant marine, as well as air and naval base-suppression missions undertaken by both sides, to determine what actually happened in order to analyze why the Japanese evacuation succeeded and why Cactus failed to stop it. Background chapters attempt to assess the respective states of readiness of the Japanese and US air arms in the South Pacific to support on the one hand and counter on the other the execution of Operation KE.The central portion of the book narrates in some detail what actually occurred in the air and at sea -- including air strikes, fighter sweeps, base suppression missions, and naval sorties -- during the crucial prelude to and the actual playing out of the interrelated events that comprised the evacuation operation. Concluding chapters analyze, on both strategic and tactical levels, the Japanese planning and execution of Operation KE, and Cactus' initiatives to interdict KE's successful prosecution. The authors conclude that both the Japanese and the American states of readiness on the eve of Operation KE suffered in such matters as optimizing both resources and operating procedures, and combating a hostile environment. Consequently, both combatants were somewhat handicapped in their abilities respectively to carry out and contest Operation KE.The author contends that the Japanese developed a reasonably sound strategy that exploited those methods and tools of war then in use in the South Pacific; to achieve success, they maximized their own strengths while taking advantage of their adversary's limitations. Contrary to the traditional view, the authors are of the opinion that Japanese utilization of their newly-built airstrip at Munda in the Central Solomons played an important role in the success of Operation KE, which was in keeping with the long-range intention of developing Munda and Vila airstrips as major forward airbases to defend against any Allied push toward Rabaul through the Solomons.The U.S., on the other hand, by consistently misreading Japanese intent regarding Operation KE and pursuing a cautious offensive strategy, blunted the tactical impact of their initiatives to counter the evacuation. Several imprudent tactical decisions and a misallocation of resources further diluted the strength of US efforts.

Six Victories examines one of the most interesting and instructive naval campaigns of World War II: the war on traffic in the Mediterranean during the fall and winter of 1941-42. It is a cautionary tale of how sea power was practiced, and how it shifted 180 degrees overnight. Based on British and Italian archival sources, the book emphasizes strategic context, the role of intelligence, and the campaign's logistics.In October 1941 the British Admiralty based a surface strike force in Malta to attack Axis sea lanes between Italy and Africa. Aided by Ultra intelligence, submarines, and bombers based in Malta, this force dominated the Central Mediterranean. From the end of October through the middle of December 1941, less than a third of the supplies shipped from Italian ports arrived in Libya. Shortages of ammunition and fuel finally compelled the Afrika Korps to retreat four hundred miles. Then, in the space of thirty hours, this all changed. First, Italian naval forces broke the blockade by fighting through a major convoy that arrived in time to blunt the British advance; next, the strike force plowed into a minefield laid by Italian cruisers; and finally, in a daring attack, Italian commandos crippled the Mediterranean Fleet's battleships in port. The swing in fortune was immediate and dramatic.Six Victories breaks new ground in the historiography of World War II. A compelling story, it relates lessons that are relevant today and should be required reading for all who practice the art of power at sea and for those who want to understand the intricate and interrelated factors that are the foundations of military success.

This book addresses three important facets of Chinas modern development. First is the ongoing modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The Chinese navy has grown from a relatively small, backward force in the 1980s into a capable twenty-first century maritime power. The PLAN now deploys around the world and includes nuclear-powered submarines, the first of several aircraft carriers, modern guided missile destroyers and frigates, and the worlds most formidable force of seagoing cruise and ballistic missiles. This modern, growing navy is intended in significant part to undergird Chinas global search for energy sources and security. Beijings determination to maintain its historic economic growth depends on energy security. These two national prioritiesa navy capable of defending Chinas national security and economic interests and secury energy resourcescome together to define and support Chinese foreign policy. This book addresses these three in both global and Asian contextual terms, with special emphasis on relations between China and the United States.

Less than five years after naval aviation led the forces that defeated Imperial Japan that very organization was in serious trouble. The force had been drastically reduced and, despite the Korean War, growing sentiment supported by no less than the chairman of the Joint Chiefs argued that the new Air Force could do anything naval aviation might be required to do. Meanwhile, the naval aviation mishap rate soared. The very survival of naval aviation was at stake. It took fifty years to turn this around. Today, in spite of hot wars, cold wars, contingencies, and peacetime operations in support of friends and allies, the Navy and Marine Corps accident rate is at least as good as that of the Air Force, and it approaches that of commercial aviation. Gear Up, Mishaps Down explains that this accomplishment was achieved through dedicated and professional leadership, a focus on lessons learned from mishaps and near-mishaps, a willingness to learn from other enterprises, and by better leadership, training, maintenance, supply and more.

Fighting the Fleet recognizes that fleets conduct four distinct but interlocking tasks at the operational level of war-striking, screening, scouting, and basing-and that successful operational art is achieved when they are brought to bear in a cohesive, competitive scheme. In explaining these elements and how they are conjoined for advantage, a central theme emerges: despite the utility and importance of jointness among the armed forces, the effective employment of naval power requires a specialized language and understanding of naval concepts that is often diluted or completely lost when too much jointness is introduced. Woven into the fabric of the book are the fundamental principles of three of the most important naval theorists of the twentieth century: Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, and Captain Wayne Hughes. While Cares and Cowden advocate the reinvigoration of combat theory and the appropriate use of operations research, they avoid over-theorizing and have produced a practical guide that empowers fleet planners to wield naval power appropriately and effectively in meeting today's operational and tactical challenges.

Historically, operations and studies regarding maritime security focus on individual threats (e.g., piracy, terrorism, narcotics, etc.) and individual measures to target them (e.g., counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics). This book explores, for the first time, an overall strategy for maritime security, integrating these issues into a single framework. Tallis argues that as maritime security threats rise in sophistication, it will be increasingly appealing to apply military resources to counter them. Military tactics, however, may not be the ideal mechanisms for addressing challenges that are often closer to crime than they are to war. Leveraging the sea services' capabilities, without overly militarizing maritime security, is a complicated problem set that requires a more strategic and partner-oriented approach to the challenge. At stake, in Tallis' estimation, is the war for tomorrow's most important communities, their human security, and the muddy waters on which they and the global system rely.

On July 31, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Maddox (DD-731) began a reconnaissance cruise off the coast of North Vietnam. On August 2, three North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the ship. On the night of August 4, the Maddox and another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy (DD-951), expecting to be attacked, saw what they interpreted as hostile torpedo boats on their radars and reported themselves under attack. The following day, the United States bombed North Vietnam in retaliation. Congress promptly passed, almost unanimously and with little debate, a resolution granting President Lyndon Johnson authority to take "all necessary measures" to deal with aggression in Vietnam. The incident of August 4, 1964, is at the heart of this book. The author interviewed numerous Americans who were present. Most believed in the moment that an attack was occurring. By the time they were interviewed, there were more doubters than believers, but the ones who still believed were more confident in their opinions. Factoring in degree of assurance, one could say that the witnesses were split right down the middle on this fundamental question. A careful and rigorous examination of the other forms of evidence, including intercepted North Vietnamese naval communications, interrogations of North Vietnamese torpedo boat personnel captured later in the war, and the destroyers' detailed records of the location and duration of radar contacts, lead the author to conclude that no attack occurred that night.

The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is naval history's most powerful and versatile warship. It is the reason the U.S. Navy is the predominant force at sea today. Throughout its illustrious history, the carrier has overcome serious flaws, including its expense, vulnerability, centralization of combat power, and its airwing's short range. The U.S. Navy always accepted those flaws because the carrier was the best means of delivering firepower. Today's technologies, however, provide key opportunities for the U.S. Navy to move beyond the limitations of a carrier-centric fleet by redesigning its force structure.Questioning the Carrier examines how the U.S. Navy can embrace the Age of the Missile, network the distributed fleet, and diversify to develop a fleet that benefits from the aircraft carrier's many strengths without being wholly dependent on them. By acting on those opportunities, the U.S. Navy can develop a structure that performs the carrier-centric fleet's functions more effectively using a force consisting of more platforms with less total risk and within the same long-term budget. As adversaries are improving their ability to deter the carrier thus causing its utility to wane, the author examines the Navy's past successes to show how it can overcome institutional resistance to change and continue to rule the seas.

Admiral Raoul Castex is France's most important modern naval strategist. Military historian Eugenia Kiesling offers the essence of Castex's original five volume study, Theories Strategiques, in a useful one-volume abridgment and a very readable translation. It emphasizes the admiral's method of strategic analysis while omitting most of the historical narrative. Included are chapters defining strategy and relating it to policy and geography, analyzing the role of maritime forces and the significance of command at sea, prescribing a theory of conduct of operations, and introducing Castex's favorite themes: strategic manoeuvre, strategie generale, and the theory of "e;perturbation."e; Two narrative chapters on German operations in the North Sea from 1914 to 1916 remain as examples of the author's historical style. The introduction places Castex's work in four distinct contexts: the international debate among naval theorists on the nature and importance of "e;command at sea,"e; the controversy within France between advocates of the "e;historical"e; and "e;material"e; schools of naval strategy, the contemporary concern over coordinated naval strategy for total war, and his contribution to the formulation of French strategy between the world wars. In an era of expanding global responsibilities and shrinking national economies, Castex's balanced view of naval power offers many insights for today's new generation of naval thinkers.

War and Resistance in the Philippines, 1942-1944 repairs the fragmentary and incomplete history of events in the Philippine Islands between the surrender of Allied forces in May 1942 and MacArthur's return in October 1944. No book has comprehensively examined the Filipino resistance during this crucial period. Here, James Kelly Morningstar provides for the first time a comprehensive history of the protracted fighting by 260,000 guerrillas in 277 units across the archipelago.Beginning with the Japanese occupation, the collapse of the United States Forces, Far East (USAFFE), and the simultaneous rise of the complex, diverse Philippine guerrilla movements, Morningstar exposes the inadequacy of MacArthur's conventional plans while revealing his inchoate preparation for guerrilla resistance. Morningstar then recounts in detail the impromptu resistance led by refugee American and Filipino soldiers, local politicians, and social revolutionaries left to battle the Japanese--and each other--with emphasis on how Japanese, American, and Filipino actions influenced and proscribed each other. From a distance, MacArthur contacted select guerrillas and organized agents to deliver supplies and radios to them by submarine. In this way he empowered some to gain power as part of a united framework under his leadership. This not only kept alive the resistance that denied the Japanese exploitation of the Philippines while setting the conditions for MacArthur's return, it also ensured that no one guerrilla leader could challenge America's supremacy. MacArthur's selective support to guerrilla groups that encouraged continued Filipino dependence on the United States would prove fatal for the incipient Maoist social revolution on Luzon. Even so, the Filipinos' shared sacrifice in their act of resistance fueled a national consciousness that created a sense of deserved nationhood.War and Resistance in the Philippines, 1942-1944 concludes with a brief discussion of legacies of the guerrilla resistance. MacArthur's return reestablished the power of American and Filipino political elites. Guerrillas and other citizens who had experienced exceptional hardship now had to fight for recognition. However, the war had resulted in a more united Philippine national identity along with new political institutions to repair the divisions between the formerly exiled government, the collaborationists, and the members of resistance. These momentous years of struggle in the Philippines changed the tide of history and challenge our understanding of war and resistance.

War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Great Power Competition and Conflict provides insights for those involved in the design of military strategy, and the forces that must execute that strategy. Emphasizing the impacts of technology, new era strategic competition, demography, and climate change, Mick Ryan uses historical as well as contemporary anecdotes throughout the book to highlight key challenges faced by nations in a new era of great power rivalry. Just as previous industrial revolutions have advanced societies, the nascent fourth industrial revolution will have a similar impact on how humans fight, compete, and build military power in the twenty-first century. After reviewing the principle catalysts of change in the security environment, War Transformed seeks to provide a preview of the shape of war and competition in the twenty-first century. Ryan examines both the shifting character of war and its enduring nature. In doing so, he proposes important trends in warfare that will shape all aspects of human competition and conflict in the coming decades. The remainder of the book analyzes how military institutions must prepare for future competition and conflict. Competing and engaging in combat in this new era involves new and evolved strategies and warfighting concepts, as well as adapting our current military organizations. It will also demand building an intellectual edge in military personnel through evolved concepts of training, education, and development. As the competitive environment and potential battlefields continue to change, conceptions of combat, competition and conflict must also evolve. Mick Ryan makes the case for transforming how Western military institutions view war in this century.

Admittedly small and vulnerable, PT boats were, nevertheless, fast-the fastest craft on the water during World War II-and Dick Keresey's account of these tough little fighters throws new light on their contributions to the war effort. As captain of PT 105, the author was in the same battle as John F. Kennedy when Kennedy's PT 109 was rammed and sunk. The famous incident, Keresey says, has often been described inaccurately and the PT boat depicted as unreliable and ineffective. This book helps set the record straight by presenting an authentic picture of PT boats that draws on the author's experience at Guadalcanal, New Georgia, Bougainville, and Choiseul Island. Action-filled, his account describes evading night bombers, rescuing coast watchers and downed airmen, setting down Marine scouts behind Japanese lines, engaging in vicious gun battles with Japanese barges and small freighters, and contending with heat, disease, and loneliness. First published in 1996, the book has been hailed for telling an exciting yet fully accurate story.

A masterpiece of World War II heroism, this book catches the spirit and tone of an incredible fighting ship, the USS Aaron Ward, a destroyer-turned-minelayer on the radar picket lines in the Pacific.

Though the Japanese treatment of prisoners of war during World War II has been written about before, only with this detailed chronicle will readers come to appreciate the true dimensions of the Allied POW experience at sea. It is a disturbing story; many believe the Bataan Death March pales by comparison. Survivors describe their ordeal in the Japanese hellships as the absolute worst experience of their captivity. Crammed by the thousands into the holds of the ships, moved from island to island and put to work, they endured all the horrors of the prison camps magnified tenfold.Gregory Michno draws on American, British, Australian, and Dutch POW accounts as well as Japanese convoy histories, recently declassified radio intelligence reports, and a wealth of archival sources to present a detailed picture of what happened. His findings are startling. More than 126,00 Allied prisoners were transported in the hellships with more than 21,000 fatalities. While beatings, starvation, and disease caused many of the deaths, the most, Michno reports, were caused by Allied bombs. Bullets, and torpedoes. He further reports that this so-called friendly fire was not always accidentalat times high-level decision were made to sink Japanese ships despite the presence of POWs. The statistics led Michno to conclude that it was more dangerous to be a prisoner on the Japanese hellships than a U.S. Marine fighting in the campaign. His careful examination of the role U.S. submarines in the sinkings and the rescue of POWs makes yet another significant contribution to the history of the Pacific war.

Few people realize the tragic situation of a country forced to capitulate to a traditional enemy. After this humiliating experience, the Navy, in its attempts to preserve Frances foreign possessions, and to supply the mother country, found itself torn between the conflicting interests of involved internal and international politics. Forced to scuttle part of the fleet at Toulon, the remainder found themselves viewed with wary suspicion by both the Germans and the Allies. That, as a Navy, they were able to survive at all is a minor miracle. That they so well preserved their unanimity as to return to the fight and participate in the final victory is in itself a tribute to the moral, discipline, and traditions that date back to the crusades. The French Navys story is now available in paperback.

In Contrails over the Mojave George Marrett takes off where Tom Wolfes The Right Stuff ended in 1963. Marrett started the Air Force Test Pilot School at Edwards AFB only two weeks after the schools commander, Col. Chuck Yeager, ejected from a Lockheed NF-104 trying to set a world altitude record. He describes life as a space cadet experiencing 15 Gs in a human centrifuge, zero-G maneuvers in a KC-135 Vomit Comet, and a flight to 80,000 feet in the F-104A Starfighter. After graduating from Yeagers Charm School, he was assigned to the Fighter Branch of Flight Test Operations, where he flew the latest fighter aircraft and chased other test aircraft as they set world speed and altitude records.Marrett takes readers into the cockpit as he goes vertical in a T-38 Talon, completes high-G maneuvers in an F-4C Phantom, and conducts wet-runway landing tests in the accident-prone F-111A Aardvark. He writes about Col. Silver Fox Stephens setting a world speed record in the YF-12 Blackbird and Bob Gilliland testing speed stalls in the SR-71 spy plane, but he also relives stories of crashes that killed test pilot friends. He recounts dead-sticking a T-38 to a landing on Rogers Dry Lake after a twin-engine failure and conducting dangerous tail hook barrier testing in a fighter jet without a canopy. A mysterious UFO sighting in the night sky above the Mojave Desert, known as The Edwards Encounter, also receives Marretts attention. Whether the author is assessing a new aircrafts performance or describing the experiences of test pilots as they routinely faced the possibility of death, this look at the golden age of flight testing both thrills and informs.

Challenging centuries-old conventional wisdom regarding the principles of war, tactics, and the roles of strategy, doctrine, experiential learning, and military history, Friedman's work offers a striking synthesis of thinking on tactics as well as strategy.

As the Vietnam War reached its tragic climax in the last days of April 1975, a task force of U.S. Navy ships cruised off South Vietnam's coast. Their mission was to support the evacuation of American embassy personnel and military advisers from Saigon as well as to secure the safety of the South Vietnamese whose lives were in endangered by the North Vietnamese victory. The Lucky Few recounts the role of the USS Kirk in the rescue of remnants of the South Vietnamese fleet and the refugees on board. The story of the Kirk reflects one of America's few shining moments at the end of the Vietnam War. Now in paperback in time for the 40th anniversary of the end of the war, The Lucky Few brings to life the heroism of Captain Paul Jacobs and the crew of the USS Kirk.

The intimate view of the U.S. Coast Guards dramatic World War II record has long been considered a classic. First published in 1957 and out of print for years, it is now available in paperback. Handsomely illustrated with more than 200 photographs, the book serves as a unique memento of one of the most illustrious periods in the Coast Guards 200-year history.The author offers a story replete with incidents of devotion far beyond the call of duty?daring rescues, adventurous high-sea missions, heroic combat action?to clearly demonstrate the vital role the service played in the Allied war effort. A seasoned World War I veteran who joined the Coast Guard Temporary Reserve in 1942, Malcolm Willoughby draws not only from firsthand experience but fro years of research and writing as a Coast Guard historian.His narrative covers every aspect of the Coast Guards involvement in the warat sea, in the air, and at home. From the invasion of Normandy, where Coast Guardsmen landed thousands of Americans and rescued some 1,500 stranded in the surf, to Guadalcanal, where they rescued three companies of Marines trapped on the beach, this chronicle vividly recounts these well-documented operations and little-known stories of individual triumphs and tragedies as well.

In this revealing work, Dag Henriksen discloses the origins and content of NATO's strategic and conceptual thinking on how the use of force was to succeed politically in altering the behavior of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The air campaign, known as Operation Allied Force, was the first war against any sovereign nation in the history of NATO and the first major combat operation conducted for humanitarian purposes against a state committing atrocities within its own borders. This book examines the key political, diplomatic, and military processes that shaped NATO and U.S. management of the Kosovo crisis and shows how air power became the main instrument in their strategy to coerce the FRY to accede to NATO's demands.The book further shows that the military leaders set to execute the campaign had no clear strategic guidance on what the operation was to achieve and that the level of uncertainty was so high that the officers selecting the bombing targets watched NATO's military spokesman on CNN for guidance in choosing their targets. Henriksen argues that structures preceding the Kosovo crisis shaped the management to a much greater degree than events taking place in Kosovo and that the air power community's largely institutionalized focus on high-intensity conflicts, like the 1991 Gulf War, hampered them from developing strategies to fit the political complexities of crises. Because fighting and wars in the lower end of the intensity spectrum are likely to surface again, study of the Kosovo crisis offers lessons for future international conflicts in which the combination of force and diplomacy will play a very significant role.

This is the dramatic history of the HAL-3 Seawolves, the U.S. Navy's first and only helicopter gunship squadron of the Vietnam War. The squadron was established "e;in country"e; to support the fast, pugnacious river patrol boats of the brown water navy. Flying combat-worn Hueys borrowed from the Army, the mission of the Seawolves quickly expanded to include rapid response air support to any friendly force in the Delta needing immediate, no-holds-barred assistance. Operating in two-plane detachments from specifically configured LSTs, hastily constructed bases, and primitive campsites, the navy gunships and their crews responded to calls within minutes. Flying in all kinds of weather, day and night, they arrived at tree-top level with forward-firing rockets and flex-guns blazing. Door gunners hung outside the violently maneuvering helicopters delivering a hail of fire with their hand-held M-60 machine guns. The Seawolves inserted SEALs deep into enemy territory, and extracted them, often despite savage enemy opposition. They rescued friendly combatants from almost certain capture or death, and evacuated the wounded when Medevac helicopters were not available.Gleaned from historical documents and the colorful recollections of more than sixty Seawolf warriors, this is the first complete history of the most decorated Navy squadron of the Vietnam War. Naval aviator Richard Knott recounts the story of the Seawolves from the dawning of the concept to the moment the last squadron commander turned out the lights.

Originally published in 1972, Christopher McKee's biography of Edward Preble remains the most authoritative source on this influential early shaper of the U.S. naval tradition. McKee (Grinnell College) documents Preble's rise from obscurity to become Thomas Jefferson's chief administrator, his relationship with Jefferson and the president' policies and strategies during the war, and also the Tripolitan activities and attitudes which confronted Preble as he sought to bring the war to an end. This Classic of Naval Literature work includes illustrations and a new introduction by the author.

The attack on Pearl Harbor is a topic of perennial interest to the American public, and a long line of popular books and movies have focused on the attack or events leading up to it. This work takes an entirely new perspective. Aimed at the general reader with an interest in World War II and the U.S. Navy, the book looks at the massive salvage effort that followed the attack, beginning with the damage control efforts aboard the sinking and damaged ships in the harbour on 7 December 1941 and ending in March 1944 when salvage efforts on the USS Utah were finally abandoned. The author tells the story in a narrative style, moving from activity to activity as the days and months wore on, in what proved to be an incredibly difficult and complex endeavour. But rather than writing a dry operational report, Dan Madsen describes the Navy's dramatic race to clear the harbour and repair as many ships as possible so they could return to the fleet ready for war. Numerous photographs, many never before published in books for the general public, give readers a real appreciation for the momentous task involved, from the raising of the USS Oglala in 1942 and the USS Oklahoma in 1943 to the eventual dismantling of the above-water portions of the USS Arizona. Madsen explains how a salvage organization was first set up, how priorities were scheduled, what specific plans were made and how they worked or, in many cases, did not work. His book is based almost entirely on primary sources, including the records of the fleet salvage unit and the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.

The authors were with the Japanese Naval Special Attack Force (Kamikaze Corps) from its inception in late 1944.

Ana Montes appeared to be a model employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Known to her coworkers as the Queen of Cuba, she was an overachiever who advanced quickly through the ranks of Latin American specialists to become the intelligence community's top analyst on Cuban affairs. But throughout her sixteen-year career at DIA, Montes sent Castro some of America's most closely guarded secrets and at the same time influenced what the United States thought it knew about Cuba. When she was finally arrested in September 2001, she became the most senior American intelligence official ever accused of operating as a Cuban spy from within the federal government. Unrepentant as she serves out her time in a federal prison in Texas, Montes remains the only member of the intelligence community ever convicted of espionage on behalf of the Cuban government.This inside account of the investigation that led to her arrest was written by Scott W. Carmichael, the DIA's senior counterintelligence investigator who persuaded the FBI to delve deeper into Montes activities. Although Montes did not fit the FBI's profile of a spy and easily managed to defeat the agency's polygraph exam, Carmichael became suspicious of her activities and, with the FBI, over a period of several years developed a solid case against her. Here he tells the story of that long and ultimately successful spy hunt. Carmichael reveals the details of their efforts to bring her to justice, offering readers a front-row seat for the first major U.S. espionage case of the twenty-first century. She was arrested less than twenty-four hours before learning details of the U.S. plan to invade Afghanistan post-September 11. Motivated by ideology and not money, Montes was one of the last "e;true believers"e; of the Communist era. Because her arrest came just ten days after 9/11, it went largely unnoticed by the American public. This book calls attention to the grave damage Montes inflicted on U.S. security--Carmichael even implicates her in the death of a Green Beret fighting Cuban-backed insurgent in El Salvador and the damage she would have continued to inflict had she not been caught.