Bücher veröffentlicht von University Press of the Pacific

This survey by the Library of Congress collects a broad range of information detailing the enormous costs-in human and material resources-incurred as a result of the war in Indochina. The compilation of this information will, I hope, serve to bring into perspective and to clarify the stark implications of United States policy toward this region. The casualty and refugee figures are sadly familiar from the daily newspapers. However, many of the other items also illustrate the profound effect of the war and may not have received the attention they deserve. For example, it is estimated that chemical herbicides have been applied to nearly one-seventh of South Vietnam (6 pounds per person), thereby destroying enough food for 600,000 people for 1 year and enough timber to meet the needs of the country, based on current demand, for 31 years. In South Vietnam agricultural productivity has been lowered; inflation is rampant (Saigon's retail prices having increased by over 700 percent since 1965); and last year the balance, if it can be called that, of trade showed approximately $600 million of imports versus exports of only $12 million. Nevertheless, although this report documents many of the measurable consequences of the war, it cannot reveal the intangible costs which in the long run may be of far greater significance. The survey spells out the casualty figures-827,000 U.S., South Vietnamese, and allied military personnel, over a million civilian casualties in South Vietnam, and countless thousands in Laos and Cambodia, and it is estimated that a third of the population of South Vietnam have become refugees in the course of the past 7 years. But those figures merely hint at the vast destruction of the social fabric and economies of Indochina wrought as a consequence of this tragic war. There is no way of measuring the true cost of a shattered social structure, lost opportunities for development, persistent inflation, black marketeering, corruption, and prostitution. The survey recalls our attention to the 296,000 wounded Americans, but it cannot document the psychological effects of war on the two million who have returned physically intact. Nor can it quantify the effects of this experience on U.S. society-not only the direct economic costs realized through our own inflation, high interest rates and balance-of-payments deficits, but also the intangible costs in terms of erosion of respect for the law, further disruption of the constitutional system of checks and balances, increased distrust of Government, and the growing use of violence as a political tool. These indirect and intangible consequences of the war will have an enduring effect on our future. It is ironic that the war which started, ostensibly, as one to defend freedom and democracy in South Vietnam may have the effect instead of seriously undermining democracy in the United States. In retrospect it is tragically clear that the almost $200 billion estimated by this study to be the cost of the war accrued so far would have been better devoted to solving the problems of our own society, rather than in pursuit of a futile military adventure which has served only to exacerbate them.J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman.

World War II remains the defining experience for the U.S. Army in the twentieth century. It has had a lasting impact on the nation and its place in the world and on the Army and the way it organizes and fights. Although historians have written numerous volumes concerning this global conflict, some gap in the literature remain. In particular, the subject of an American field army headquarters and its organization and role have attracted little attention. Studies on the personalities and styles of individual commanders exist, but the command posts themselves-the ways in they were structures and operated and the functions they performed-have not been much explored. With A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943-1945, the Center of Military History attempts to redress this shortcoming. This study addresses the First Army headquarters in the European theater from its activation in October 1943 to V-E Day in May 1945. Under Generals Omar N. Bradley and Courtney H. Hodges, the First Army headquarters oversaw the American landings on D-Day, the breakout from the Normandy beachhead, the battle of Hürtgen Forest along the German frontier, the defense of the northern shoulder during the Battle of the Bulge, and the crossing of the Rhine River at Remagen prior to the final American drive into central Germany. In examining the First Army headquarters' role, this volume shows the army headquarters of World War II as a complicated organization with functions ranging from the immediate supervision of tactical operations to long-range operational planning and the sustained support of frontline units. The commander and staff faced the problem of coordination with Allied counterparts as well as with headquarters and units from other services. Inadequate information and the limitations of technology added to their challenges. The human dimension was always important, and at times critical, in affecting the work of the headquarters under the stresses of a difficult campaign against an obstinate and resourceful foe. Although times have changed and the modern Army focuses more on regional conflicts and contingencies than on global warfare, we can still learn much from the experience of the First Army headquarters. The Gulf War reemphasized the role of an army headquarters in a theater of operations as a pertinent issue for today's military professional. By examining the experience of soldiers in past conflicts we gain the deeper perspectives and understandings necessary to meet the challenges facing the Army today and in the future.Washington, D.C. JOHN S. BROWN21 June 2000 Brigadier General, USA Chief of Military History

The author of this unusual work was one of the most enigmatic, eccentric of English writers. He lived and died in poverty, and was as unscrupulous in grasping for money as were the Borgias he wrote about in their grasping for power. He spent his adult life eluding bill collectors and landlords, begging money from friends or strangers, composing fanatically belligerent notes to publishers demanding funds they had allegedly promised him, and extorting money from hapless benefactors whose faith in him proved most often to be unfounded. Nevertheless, he produced several books of superior quality which are sui generis in their vitality, color, and individuality. The present work is an example. It is by no means a work of objective, rigorously documented scholarship; it teems with Corvo's personal hypotheses, prejudices, and grudges. It steadfastly examines every accusation that has ever been made against the Borgias. Yet it conjures up a picture of Renaissance Italy which may not be historically accurate in every detail, but which vibrates with the spirit of the age. The book is broad in scope, relating to the movements of the Borgia Family during the whole of its career as the ruling house of Italy. In a style that is by turn lyric, dramatic, humorous, sonorous and epigrammatic, Corvo traces the lives of Alonso Borgia (who became Pope Calixtus III), Roderigo Borgia (later Pope Alexander VI), the redoubtable Cesare Borgia and his heralded sister Lucrezia, and other lesser known but equally interesting figures of the Borgia clan. The narrative is spiced with illuminating anecdotes, curious lore, and little-known sidelights in connection with the people and events of that incomparable era. Some of the most absorbing passages are those in which Corvo interrupts the narrative to reflect on such matters as calumny (all charges against the Borgias come under this heading), the loneliness of the popes, the classic learning of the Renaissance, the superiority of the 16th-century methods and mores to 20th-century ones, and many other subjects he feels constrained to remark upon. Perhaps the most engrossing chapter of all is the one which examines the matter of poisoning in the light of the superstitions that were still alive during the Borgia era.

The book was written for anyone interested in the subject. It should be specially helpful to designers and builders of ships, marine engineers, operators, shippers, managers, government officials, lawyers, and underwriters. It will also appeal to others, including nuclear scientists and engineers, scientists and engineers in other fields, teachers, students, and writers. The first two chapters furnish orientation on the subject of nuclear ships, and the third provides technical background for readers with no background in nuclear science. Logically, the longest chapter in the book (Chap. 4) is devoted to the Savannah herself. Several succeeding chapters cover precautions taken in design, construction, and operation to ensure safety. In this aspect of the ship development, the history of nuclear central-station plants seems to be repeating itself: in unknown areas it is better to take many precautions that later will be found unnecessary than to run the risk of not taking the one safety measure that might prove essential. Fueling nuclear ships, very different from taking on fuel oil, is covered in Chap. 7, and the extensive training of the crew in nuclear technology and reactor operation is described in Chap. 8. Concluding chapters cover international aspects of nuclear merchant-ship propulsion such as handling in other ports, safety standards, and insurance; the suitability of different reactors; and economics. The last two chapters are devoted to nuclear tanker design, since it appears that the first economic application may be for large tankers operating long distances, and to nuclear ship activities elsewhere in the world including the Russian icebreaker Lenin.

Part 1 comprises the matter recorded in the field by Jeremiah Curtin in 1883, 1886, and 1887 on the Cattaraugus reservation, near Versailles, New York, including tales, legends and myths. This work of Mr. Curtin represents in part the results of the first serious attempt to record with satisfactory fullness the folklore of the Seneca. The material consists largely of narratives or tales of fiction-naive productions of the story-teller's art which can lay no claim to be called myths, although undoubtedly they contain many things that characterize myths-narratives of the power and deeds of one or more of the personified active forces or powers immanent in and expressed by phenomena or processes of nature in human guise or in that of birds or beasts. Part 2 also consists of Seneca legends and myths, which are translations made expressly for this work from native texts recorded by J. N. B. Hewitt in the autumn of 1896.

Triumph in the Philippines is the third volume in the subseries to deal with the reconquest of the Philippine Archipelago. The narrative traces the broad strategic vision that was employed in arriving at the decision to invade Luzon and bypass Formosa as a steppingstone to Okinawa. This study focuses on the Luzon Campaign with twenty-nine of its thirty-two chapters devoted to this subject. Although the Pacific is decidedly a joint theater, the reader will find only passing references to naval activities in support of this campaign and will have to look to other sources for a more complete picture. On 9 January 1945, the Sixth Army under the command of Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger commenced the largest United States Army operation in the Pacific. It entailed the use of more ground forces than did the operations in North Africa, Italy, or southern France. Unlike previous operations in the Pacific, the number of U.S. troops engaged, coupled with the ability to maneuver these forces in the central plains north of Manila, was more characteristic of European operations than any other Pacific campaign. By the time the campaign officially closed on 15 August 1945, over sixteen American divisions, or their equivalents, were committed to the liberation of the Philippines and the fulfillment of MacArthur's promise. Starting with the landings at Lingayen Gulf, this volume traces the advance of the U.S. troops through the Philippine central plains and the recapture of Clark Air Base and Manila. The volume ends with U.S. troops in northern Luzon and the southern Philippines. Unusual for the Pacific theater are the operations associated with the capture of a major urban center, which proved to be more costly and destructive than originally estimated. Accurate intelligence, always in short supply during hostilities, proved no less allusive in 1945. Throughout the campaign intelligence estimates between MacArthur and his field headquarters varied widely, affecting both strategic and tactical decisions. No where is this more evident than in the D-Day estimate of Japanese strength on Luzon. Eight days after the invasion, the Sixth Army's original estimate of 152,500 defenders had been raised to 234,500, which proved closer to the Japanese actual strength of some 250,000. Continued overly optimistic assessments of Japanese strength eventually took its toll in American casualties and on morale during the seven and one-half months of campaigning. When the war ended, General Yasmashita, the Japanese commander, was still conducting an active defense in northern Luzon with over 65,000 troops, estimated at the time by General Krueger to be no more then 23,000. Because of the surrender, large numbers of Japanese sources were available to the author, providing insight into the extensive Japanese dispositions, plans, and actions. The reader will find that due credit is given in this volume to the Japanese and their defense of the Philippines.

This book chronicles the introduction of chemical agents in World War I, the U.S. Army's tentative preparations for gas warfare prior to and after American entry into the war, and the AEF experience with gas on the Western Front. Chemical warfare affected tactics and almost changed the outcome of World War I. The overwhelming success of the first use of gas caught both sides by surprise. Fortunately, the pace of hostilities permitted the Allies to develop a suitable defense to German gas attacks and eventually to field a considerable offensive chemical capability. Nonetheless, from the introduction of chemical warfare in early 1915 until Armistice Day in November, 1918, the Allies were usually one step behind their German counterparts in the development of gas doctrine and the employment of gas tactics and procedures. In his final report to Congress on World War I, General John J. Pershing expressed the sentiment of contemporary senior officers when he said, "Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question." General Pershing was the last American field commander actually to confront chemical agents on the battlefield. Today, in light of a significant Soviet chemical threat and solid evidence of chemical warfare in Southeast and Southwest Asia, it is by no means certain he will retain that distinction. Over 50 percent of the Total Army's Chemical Corps assets are located within the United States Army Reserve. This book was prepared by the USAR Staff Officer serving with the Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, after a number of requests from USAR Chemical Corps officers for a historical study on the nature of chemical warfare in World War I. In fulfilling the needs of the USAR, this book also meets the needs of the Total Army in its preparations to fight, if necessary, on a battlefield where chemical agents might be employed.Carl E. VuonoLieutenant General, USACommandant

This publication is about solar energy and how its use for heating and cooling will affect dwelling design and site planning. It has been prepared as a brief introduction for consumers, designers, and builders interested in solar heating and cooling. Beginning with a brief history of solar energy applications, a more thorough description of solar components and how they are organized into heating, cooling and domestic hot water systems follows. Next, factors which influence the design of solar dwellings and systems are discussed. The remain portion of the publication illustrates dwelling and site design concepts responsive to these factors for various housing types, solar systems, and climates.

Originally published in the Soviet Union, this very comprehensive dictionary gives some very different perspectives on philosophy.

The theory of elasticity developed as a science due to the necessity of having theoretical methods for calculating the strength of parts of structures and machines. At present the theory of elasticity is a branch of mathematical physics that must be at the finger tips both of engineers and scientists studying the strength of structures and machines. The book Theory of Elasticity is a textbook for students of higher technical schools of the Soviet Union. It contains matter on the theory of stresses, the geometrical theory of strain, the torsion of prismatic bars and the bending of plates. It sets forth the theoretical fundamentals of the solution of elasticity problems in terms of displacement and stresses and shows the general methods of solving problems in the theory of elasticity. The book considers plane problems in Cartesian and in polar coordinates. In conclusion the author deals with the variational methods of elasticity.

One of the greatest classics on hypnotism, first published in 1846. The author lists at the outset 73 painless surgical operations (including the removal of an 80-pound scrotal tumor) performed in the previous eight months while patients were in mesmeric trances, and cites eighteen cases of cures brought about by animal magnetic passes. He describes many of his surgical procedures, the null mortality rate he effected, and the modes in which Mesmeric fluid may be transmitted. Although this work, along with Elliotson's Numerous Cases of Surgical Operations Without Pain was briefly influential, experimentation of the kind Esdaile carried out was cut short by the discovery of an effective chemical anaesthesia the very year Mesmerism in India was published James Esdaile (1808-1859), a Scottish surgeon who was appointed Surgeon to Government of India, performed at least 291 painless operations in India using hypnotism. Aroused by his success, the Indian government soon established a mesmeric hospital for him. Esdaile performed a variety of surgical operations on Hindus, upon many of whom he appears successfully to have induced hypnotic anaesthesia. However, his similar attempts with Europeans were not so successful.